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Accountability in Health Systems and the Potential of mHealth 
Linda Waldman, Philip Reed and Tabitha Hrynick 
 
Summary  
The rapid spread of information and communication technologies (ICTs) (and of mobile 
phones in particular) across low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) has generated 
considerable excitement in development circles regarding their potential to revolutionise 
service delivery in health systems. Broadly speaking, such innovations, widely referred to as 
mHealth, make possible new ways of collecting, collating and managing health and health 
service-related data, and novel means of communication between and among citizens, civil 
society, health service personnel and government actors. This can empower citizens to 
better understand, care and advocate for their own health; health workers to deliver improved 
services; and government actors to enforce or build health policies that uphold the health 
rights of all citizens, including poor and marginalised groups who are often systematically 
excluded from health systems.  
 
As mHealth is in its infancy, and most projects to date have been small in scale, this potential 
is still being tested. Furthermore, most research has focused on the extent to which mHealth 
has improved service delivery and/or health outcomes in the short term. There has been little 
explicit attention given to whether and how mHealth might improve accountability for public 
health services – that is, to what extent mHealth can enhance citizens’ abilities to demand 
improved services from providers and government in line with their rights, and/or augment 
the capacity and willingness of providers and government to respond to citizens’ needs and 
demands – both in the short and the long term.   
 
This Working Paper aims to begin to fill this gap by exploring literature on accountability in 
health systems and on mHealth and to build theoretical and empirical bridges between them. 
In so doing, we lay out a clearer understanding of the role that mHealth can play in 
accountability for public health services in LMICs, as well as its limitations. At the centre of 
this role is technology-facilitated information which, for instance, can help governments 
enforce and improve existing health policy, and which can assist citizens and civil society to 
communicate with each other to learn more about their rights, and to engage in data 
collection, monitoring and advocacy. Ultimately however, information, facilitated as it may be 
by mHealth, does not automatically lead to improved accountability. Different forms of health 
care come with different accountability challenges to which mHealth is only variably up to 
task. Furthermore, health systems, embedded as they are in diverse political, social and 
economic contexts, are extremely complex, and accountability requires far more than 
information. Thus, mHealth can serve as a tool for accountability, but is likely only able to 
make a difference in institutional systems that support accountability in other ways (both 
formal and informal) and in which political actors and health service providers are willing and 
able to change their behaviour.     
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1 Introduction 
Accountability – or the relationship between states and citizens and how citizens get access 
to state resources – has long been the subject of theoretical and empirical investigation. In 
relation to liberal democracies, the essence of this contract holds that states are accountable 
for providing services and upholding the rights of an empowered citizenry, which is able to 
make demands on a responsive state. For this relationship to work, enabling conditions and 
mechanisms for accountability (including transparent information made available to citizens 
regarding the state and its duties) are necessary to ensure that citizens are guaranteed their 
rights, including rights to health. 
 
Recent innovations in information and communication technologies (ICTs) and digital 
technology have introduced new possibilities for strengthening accountability between states 
and citizens. In digital health, for instance, a range of eHealth and mHealth1 innovations offer 
new potential to radically reshape health systems. Defined by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) as ‘Medical and public health practice supported by mobile devices, such as mobile 
phones, patient monitoring devices, personal digital assistants, and other wireless devices’ 
(WHO Global Observatory for eHealth 2011: 6), mHealth initiatives are widely regarded as 
having the potential to enhance accountability in health systems in low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs) because of the growing ubiquity of mobile phones in these contexts. While 
there has been much excitement regarding the potential of mHealth, there have been few 
concerted efforts to interrogate the assumptions underlying this enthusiasm – namely that 
mHealth interventions can and do lead to improved health services and accountability 
relationships in health systems. 
 
A Web of Science search looking at the periods from 2004–5, 2009–10 and 2014–15 yielded 
zero published articles with the terms ‘accountability’ and ‘mHealth’ in their titles. A topic 
search of the same time periods and using the same terms yielded only five articles from 
2014–15, which themselves did not explicitly take on this challenge. In beginning to fill this 
gap, this literature review explores the emerging relationship between accountability, health 
systems and mHealth initiatives. Accountability in health systems, especially in low-resource 
contexts, comes with a unique set of challenges due to the low capacity of states and the 
nature of health rights, health services, and patterns of health-seeking behaviours among 
citizens. mHealth initiatives, which have been introduced in a number of contexts, usually 
aim to improve access to health services, the work of service providers and the quality of the 
services they provide. By interrogating the relationship between health systems and mHealth 
through an accountability lens, this paper seeks to go beyond these first-order aims of 
individual mHealth mechanisms to identify areas requiring further development (Brinkerhoff 
2004). What follows is a review of health systems and accountability, and an investigation of 
the scope that mHealth initiatives may have for improving accountability and transparency in 
health systems. 
 
 
2 Accountability in health systems 
The right to health, although variably interpreted, is recognised by a number of international 
human rights treaties2 and enshrined into the constitutions and laws of many nations.  
                                                          
1  Digital health embraces both eHealth and mHealth. The term ‘eHealth’ covers a wide range of technologies that can 
facilitate access to health and health systems. This includes telephones, computers, and wireless communications. 
‘mHealth’, which refers specifically to mobile phone or other handheld devices, is a subset of eHealth. 
2 The earliest articulation of the human right to health in the international arena appeared in the 1946 Constitution of the 
World Health Organization. This was followed by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This right was also affirmed by the 1969 International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All 
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In order to provide for this right, governments are obligated to make health services 
available, either directly (through secondary agents) or by regulating markets of health 
service options. Most nation states are involved in the provision and/or regulation of health 
services in some capacity and find it necessary and desirable to ensure functioning health 
systems, as health care is particularly vulnerable to market failure (Castro-Leal et al. 2000). 
Markets tend to undersupply ‘public goods’ such as sanitation or vaccination, and thus 
cannot ensure the positive externalities (such as individual immunisation positively benefiting 
others) that stem from these and other health services. Furthermore, markets also fail to 
insure against the possibility of significant health risks and do not address inequalities in 
access to health services (Bloom, Standing and Lloyd 2008). Public health systems are thus 
the mechanisms through which governments use of public funding to ensure good health of 
national populations through the delivery of quality health services to all citizens. This is 
achieved through a combination of appropriate financing mechanisms (public and private), 
specialised, well-trained workforces, regular and good information to inform financing and 
decision-making, and sophisticated systems of facilities and logistics. 
 
LMICs face particularly steep obstacles in providing appropriate, efficient, quality health 
services for their citizens as they experience low institutional capacity in conjunction with 
multiple, often dire national health issues. Nonetheless, health systems in LMICs receive 
significant budgetary allocations; they are comprised of highly specialised staff who have 
‘significant power to affect people’s lives and well-being’ and are often characterised by 
inefficiency, corruption, service failures, access problems, poor quality provision and so forth 
(Brinkerhoff 2004: 371). This makes strengthening accountability relationships vital for 
improving standards and procedures, and minimising misuse, mistreatment and corruption 
while promoting efficiency and performance. 
 
Accountability, as a concept, is difficult to capture analytically (Brinkerhoff 2004; Loewenson 
2008), and scholars have offered wide-ranging interpretations and definitions of it. According 
to Edwards and Hulme, it refers rather mechanistically to ‘the means by which individuals 
and organisations report to a recognised authority, or authorities, and are held responsible 
for their actions’ (1996: 9). However, this is somewhat limiting in its emphasis on 
accountability to an upwards, immediately identifiable ‘authority’. 
 
Accountability also helps ensure that decision makers – those in conventional positions of 
power – observe publicly agreed standards, norms and goals. For Brinkerhoff, ‘the essence 
of accountability is answerability; being accountable means having the obligation to answer 
questions regarding decisions and/or actions’ (2004: 372). This brings anyone vested with 
responsibility, including authorities, into the fold of accountability. Indeed, accountability is a 
key element of the social contract between a government and its citizens as it emphasises 
the relationship between the duties of the state and the corresponding entitlements of 
citizens, through the provision of certain goods, services, rights and protections.3 
Accountability also helps identify specifically ‘who’ has a responsibility to act to ensure that 
specified rights are fulfilled ‘to whom’ (UN 2013). And while answerability of those 
responsible is essential, transparency and enforceability also comprise key components of 
accountability; for somebody to be accountable for their actions they must answer for them, 
but there must also be reliable and timely information about what has been done along with 
enforceable consequences for inadequate performance (Goetz and Jenkins 2005; Moore 
and Teskey 2006; Akpanuko and Asogwa 2013). 
                                                          
Forms of Discrimination against Women, the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the 2006 Convention on 
the Rights of People with Disabilities. All nations have recognised the right to health through the ratification of at least 
one international human rights treaty (OHCHR 2008). 
3  When focusing on the provision of public services as a duty of the state, less tangible rights such as protection from 
discrimination, safeguarding of freedom of speech and access to information, the right to vote, the right to assemble, 
etc. often get overlooked. And yet such rights are necessary precursors for citizens, particularly poor and marginalised 
people, to demand accountability from government services. 
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Accountability in health systems refers to a system of checks and balances on power and 
discretion achieved through a range of different mechanisms. It involves the provision of 
information (on budgets, activities, outputs, etc.) alongside explanations and justifications 
(why certain things are being done and not others) and sanctions for failure to perform. This 
might happen ‘horizontally’, in that different government bodies monitor each other in 
processes internal to the state (O’Donnell 1998), ‘vertically’ and thus unfolding between the 
state and citizens, or through mutually reinforcing independent or hybrid measures (Goetz 
and Jenkins 2001). 
 
Given that citizens should be the ultimate beneficiaries of state services and protection, 
scholars and practitioners have argued for the importance of strengthening accountability 
relationships between citizens and the state through citizen-centric mechanisms, especially 
in contexts where accountability processes internal to the state are weak (Fox 2015). This 
‘social accountability’ approach emphasises the role of citizens themselves in holding 
governments and providers to account. Some emphasise the centrality of citizen-led 
collective action as necessary for transformative social accountability (McGee and Gaventa 
2011; Joshi 2013), while others take a more generous interpretation. Malena, Forster and 
Singh (2004), for instance, define social accountability quite broadly to encompass a wide 
range of mechanisms, from bottom-up citizen initiatives such as community monitoring 
efforts (Björkman and Svensson 2009) or protests, to state-sponsored initiatives inviting 
citizens into policymaking and performance monitoring spaces such as the participatory 
health councils of Brazil (Coelho 2006; Cornwall and Shankland 2013). 
 
Social accountability, also termed ‘bottom-up accountability’, is particularly significant in 
relation to poor and marginalised people and communities who are often overlooked by the 
state, and frequently lack the capacity to make demands (Sirker and Cosic 2007; Ringold et 
al.; Srinivasan 2012; UN 2013). It can facilitate a number of processes: as it encourages 
citizens to claim their entitlements, it has the potential to empower poor and marginalised 
communities; it can promote constructive engagement between individuals and communities 
and those who are responsible to provide specified goods, services and protections; it can 
put pressure on duty-bearers to justify and explain their actions; and it can expose 
absenteeism, corruption and violations, and potentially trigger disciplinary mechanisms 
already embedded in the state. However, it is not a given in poor communities and ‘steps 
should be taken to lift the barriers’ (UN 2013: xiv) that prevent them from mobilising or from 
making use of accountability mechanisms already in place. Yet, putting these steps in place 
is challenging and, as McGee and Gaventa (2011) indicate, fraught with assumptions, risks 
and unpredictability. This is particularly challenging in health systems for a number of 
reasons. Take, for instance, the high power asymmetries that can exist between poor 
patients and health service providers who may see these health service users as passive 
beneficiaries – ill-equipped to make health-related decisions – and who should be grateful for 
any level of care (Lodenstein et al. 2016). This, along with many other contextually varying 
factors (expanded on later), can breed resistance among providers to respond to demands 
from below. Indeed, scholars have observed that successful social accountability initiatives 
are often predicated on some support from state actors to apply complementary pressure or 
reform from above (Joshi 2013; Peixoto and Fox 2016). 
 
At their heart, social accountability mechanisms rely on information in order for citizens to 
know exactly what services and entitlements should be provided, and whether or not they are 
being adequately addressed. Because digital technologies have provided new ways of 
generating and accessing information, they have been seen as ideal in promoting and 
implementing social accountability mechanisms (UN 2013). mHealth, for instance, can 
harness the potential of mobile phones for real-time information transfer between citizens 
and the state. For example, citizens might be enabled to monitor service providers’ 
absenteeism, to report poor service or corruption, and to share this information with each 
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other. However, it is important to remember that the increasing ubiquity of mobile phones 
does not erase, and may even exacerbate, existing structural inequalities (Gorman 2015). 
Digital literacy and access to technology – necessary for engaging with ICT-enabled 
accountability mechanisms – may be much lower among marginalised groups. 
 
Before moving to a more in-depth discussion of the role of digital technologies for 
accountability in health systems, the following sections explore some theoretical 
considerations and the multitude of factors that can have a bearing on accountability in 
health systems. Such variables range from the (un)democratic characteristics of political 
regimes, to the way formal institutions are designed, function and are affected by informal 
social norms, to the inherent characteristics of health services and citizen demand for them. 
Service provision and accountability are also complicated by the fact that health systems, 
especially in LMICs, are frequently (at least partially) marketised. They do not rely exclusively 
on the state and are, in fact, made up not only of public services but also involve a patchwork 
of private actors including informal healers, traditional birth attendants and private clinics. 
Out-of-pocket payments, even for ostensibly ‘free’ public services, may also be 
commonplace. Bloom et al. thus argue that in LMICs, health systems operate in 
‘environments characterised by high levels of unorganised markets in health services and 
commodities, porousness of boundaries between public and private health care sectors and 
lack of state regulatory capacity’ (2008: 2076). 
 
Such messy and complex realities, conditions of low institutional capacity, and limited 
democracy, social trust and citizen participation can make it highly challenging to develop 
and sustain effective mechanisms and relationships for accountability. Even seemingly well-
designed policy and accountability measures may not correct the perverse incentives felt by 
providers and public officials when it comes to on-the-ground implementation (McGee and 
Gaventa 2011). And limited resources can dash the good intentions of even well-meaning 
policymakers and create unavoidable tensions. There can be, for instance, considerable 
divergence in the interpretations of accountability between governments and private sector 
interests. There are tensions between government demands for a minimum level of care for 
all, and user and private sector incentives to seek the maximum amount of care for specific 
people’s needs. Tensions also exist between accountability at policy level (which seeks to 
ensure that resources are appropriately distributed and used) and at service level (which 
aims to ensure that each patient receives the health care they need). Furthermore, 
monitoring health provider performance is not straightforward and may require sophisticated 
medical knowledge as well as detailed information tracking procedures on a wide range of 
factors, including budgets, fees, medical stocks, vehicles, medical surgeries and personnel 
arrangements (Brinkerhoff 2004). And as more advantaged citizens can exercise voice and 
pressure politicians more effectively, the distribution of health resources is likely to favour 
their needs to the exclusion of marginalised groups (Fox 2015). Thus, measures for greater 
accountability and enabling conditions for citizens from across the social spectrum to 
participate in creating and sustaining them are necessary – but the likelihood of such 
measures emerging may be lessened by the same weak institutional capacity and limited 
resources which also strain the provision of adequate health services. This makes it 
imperative that existing resources and institutional capacity are harnessed and their 
efficiency maximised, while citizen voice – especially that of poor and marginalised groups – 
is upheld and supported. 
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3 Theoretical conceptualisations of health 
systems and accountability 
Theoretical explorations which examine accountability in health systems borrow from the 
disciplinary traditions of political economy, sociology, economics and managerial studies. 
Such explorations offer ways to evaluate health systems, identify points of weakness and 
failure and, most importantly, provide the analytical foundations for increasing accountability, 
and thus improving health services. This section explores literature on accountability in 
health systems by presenting ideas in two broad and complementary conceptual veins, 
which offer different approaches to the evaluation of health system accountability challenges 
and reveal where measures for accountability, such as those made possible by mHealth, 
might be introduced or strengthened. 
 
The first conceptual theme examines institutions and accountability, and focuses on a range 
of overlapping considerations, namely: the formal architecture of the state, including how 
policies shape incentives, constraints and accountability relationships; the character of the 
state, such as the degree of centralisation, democracy, citizen participation, stability, and 
overall capacity for effective governance; and the informal social practices that affect, and 
are affected by, the formal institutional environment. This allows for an assessment of the 
ways in which health systems and institutions can facilitate and enhance accountability. 
 
The second conceptual theme shifts the analytical lens to address the political implications of 
the inherent characteristics of health services and use. Characteristics once thought of as 
relevant only to economistic or managerial concerns – such as how frequently citizens use 
services – are recast and shown to have profound implications for accountability within 
health systems (Harris et al. 2014). When considered within particular political and 
institutional contexts, points of weakness and potential intervention are revealed. 
 
Taken together, these two perspectives offer a comprehensive picture of the accountability 
challenges and opportunities for health systems in LMICs against which the potential and 
limitations of mHealth interventions can be weighed. 
 
 
4 The role of institutions 
One way to assess accountability in health systems is by foregrounding institutions – here 
referring broadly to formal and informal rules and practices (North 1990) – and how these 
affect dynamics of accountability and thus the quality and outcomes of health systems 
overall. Laying out the basic requirements for accountable relationships is a starting point 
from which institutional analysis can begin. Camargo (2011) and Camargo and Jacobs 
(2011), while applying institutional analysis to the provision of public health services in LMICs 
specifically, have echoed the World Bank in using a principal–agent framework to explore 
accountability relationships. The ‘principal’ usually refers to citizen users of health services or 
those who represent them, such as the state or, on occasions, sections of civil society. The 
‘agent’ refers to those performing a service for the principal. This usually means service 
providers, but the state is also an agent insofar as it performs a service for citizens in holding 
service providers to account on their behalf.4 
 
                                                          
4  As earlier discussed, states must also perform the work of protecting the less tangible rights of citizens which while not 
directly linked to specific services, enable citizens to actively participate in holding both the state and service providers 
to account. 
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Beyond the links between citizens, states and providers, many principal–agent relationships 
can be identified in health systems. Indeed, as Brinkerhoff suggests: 
 
the accountability landscape is filled with a broad array of actors with multiple 
connections; in some cases these actors are both accountable to one set of actors 
while simultaneously exercising accountability with regard to another set… These 
connections create layered webs of accountability with varying degrees of autonomy 
and sources of control/oversight. 
(Brinkerhoff 2004: 377) 
 
As discussed further below, depending on the particular accountability problem that needs to 
be addressed, different relationships are more or less salient and worth investigation and 
reform. 
 
The five essential components of accountable principal–agent relationships as outlined by 
the World Bank (2004) and Camargo (2011) are as follows: 
 
 Clear mandates. Responsibilities of agents must be clearly defined, or there is scope 
for abuse. 
 Adequate resources and mechanisms for financing. Agents must be supplied with the 
resources necessary to carry out their mandates. 
 Information-gathering mechanisms. Information collection on service outcomes and 
agent performance should be conducted consistently. Data should be easily accessible 
by principals to determine whether the mandate is being adequately met. 
 Monitoring mechanisms. Active and transparent monitoring of this information should 
be in place. 
 Enforcement mechanisms. Sanctions and disciplinary actions against agents who fail 
to perform must be available, enforceable and effective. 
 
As indicated, principals and agents must be able to carry out particular responsibilities. 
Ideally, the principal provides adequate resources and a clear mandate for, oversees the 
performance of, and sanctions when necessary the agent, who in turn acts responsively 
(World Bank 2004: 47). Thus, formal institutions must be designed to strike a careful balance 
of incentives among state actors, service providers and citizens to support coherent 
functioning between these different elements. 
 
In reality, however, the basic configurations of these ‘accountability relationships’, which 
should ultimately benefit citizens, can be profoundly complicated and skewed by institutional 
factors. They may cause distortions in the incentives and constraints of public officials and 
service providers in ways which mean that citizens – especially the most vulnerable – are not 
necessarily the actors to whom the former feel accountable. Camargo’s framework (2011) 
invites consideration of the components of accountable relationships within health systems. 
First, if mandates and responsibilities of public officials and/or health service providers are 
not clearly defined, discretionary power – of which health providers inherently have a lot – 
can be abused, and failures cannot be easily attributed. Second, the ways in which health 
services are funded and health workers are paid can influence the direction of accountability 
‘upward’ to managers or the state rather than ‘downward’ to users. If services are funded by 
taxes or user fees, and health worker pay and career advancement are reliant on patient 
satisfaction, the incentive to deliver quality service may be stronger. Conversely, if services 
are largely funded by donors – as is the case in many LMICs – and provider pay is not linked 
to performance, the incentive for accountability to citizens may be weaker (Berlan and 
Shiffman 2012). It may also be the case that there are simply not enough resources (financial 
or otherwise), and/or that the available resources do not get to their intended destinations 
having been siphoned off or rerouted along the way (see, for example, Gauthier and Wane 
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2009); both scenarios affect health providers’ morale (through, for example, delays in the 
payment of wages) and their ability to deliver services (through inadequate supplies). 
 
Other institutional factors which skew accountability relationships are related to information, 
monitoring, sanctions and enforcement. Weak institutional capacity or corruption might mean 
a lack of effective and transparent data-gathering mechanisms, which inform authorities 
and/or citizens on provider performance. Transparent information is essential for 
accountability as, in the absence of reliable and timely information, there can be no basis for 
demanding answers or enforcing sanctions (Moore and Teskey 2006). Even where 
information-collection mechanisms exist, however, they may be calibrated for ensuring 
efficient spending and use of resources by providers rather than determining how well they 
are meeting the health needs of patients and the communities they serve (Madon, Krishna 
and Michael. 2010; Smith et al. 2008). Furthermore, even if the data collected are geared 
towards improving services for patients, information – even if publicly available – does not 
always lead to action for accountability (Ringold et al. 2012; Kolstad and Wiig 2009). The 
state (or citizens or civil society) may not have the capacity to effectively monitor that 
information, demand answers or enforce sanctions against providers when necessary 
(Camargo 2011). Moreover, citizens are less likely to take an active role in monitoring or 
‘sounding the alarm’ if they do not believe their actions will lead to change (Joshi and 
Houtzager 2012). 
 
Finally, sanctions (when available) may range from more concrete legal action, such as fines 
or the revocation or suspending of medical licences, to ‘softer’ measures, including 
reputation-damaging publicity and exposure – but it is their enforceability and effectiveness 
that is the lynchpin of strong accountability (Brinkerhoff 2004). Informal institutional practices 
of clientelism and patronage, or a highly centralised political structure and conditions of weak 
democracy, can reduce the capacity or likelihood of sanctions being applied or enforced, and 
thus ultimately being effective (Camargo and Jacobs 2011; Stremlau, Fantini and 
Gagliardone 2015; Devarajan, Khemani and Walton 2014). Another type of soft sanction is 
the self-policing of professional medical communities through codes of conduct, which 
promote standards of quality and patient care, and appeal to an intrinsic sense of 
professional pride and social responsibility (Sullivan 2000; Bloom et al. 2008). However, 
reliance on such self-policing mechanisms in LMICs is ‘insufficient for improved 
accountability in the absence of transparency, informed health service users and regulatory 
enforcement’ (Brinkerhoff 2004: 373; Harris et al. 2014). 
 
Due to the range of potential institutional pitfalls for accountability, some of which are 
outlined above, Camargo (2011) and Camargo and Jacobs (2011) suggest identifying points 
of accountability failure whether related to mandates, resources, information, monitoring, 
sanctions and/or enforcement. Reform can then be targeted at these ‘key institutional 
junctures’ either through the ‘long’ or ‘short’ accountability routes (Camargo 2011; World 
Bank 2004). The long accountability route is the relationship which extends between citizens 
and the state and, in turn, between the state and health service providers, while the short 
accountability route relates to the relationship between citizens and providers directly. 
Depending on the incentives and constraints generated by institutional arrangements, both 
present distinct opportunities and challenges for improving accountability in health systems. 
 
4.1 The long accountability route 
In the long accountability route, the state, in its role as ‘agent’, ideally ensures that 
appropriate health services are provided. Broadly speaking, two key steps are required for 
this to happen. The first involves making the health needs and demands of citizens known to 
policymakers so they can be incorporated into policy. Traditionally, this is captured partly in 
political electoral platforms and the ways in which political parties compete for votes, and 
partly in the compilation of health statistics and population-level health needs. In some 
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circumstances, participatory forums, civil society engagement or other citizen-focused social 
accountability mechanisms might also capture and communicate citizen voice regarding 
health needs (Coelho 2006; Mahmud 2007). Accountability here refers in part to the 
processes by which citizens have a say in the public provision of health services, and 
whether they have the ability to react to and to discipline policymakers when and if they fail to 
address issues of poor, inadequate or missing services (Camargo 2011). 
 
The second step of the long accountability route involves the processes through which public 
authorities design and implement policies, regulations and sanctions to shape the incentives of 
health-care providers to address the health needs of the population as interpreted by the state. 
From this perspective, the state takes on the role of the ‘principal’ to whom providers are 
then ‘agent’ and accountable to carry out the mandate to deliver health services. While this 
step does not concern citizen participation directly and rather relates to relations between the 
state and providers, policymakers’ actions comprise a vital part of social accountability; they 
create the incentives and processes that drive individual staff and provider organisations to 
respond to citizen demands and act in accountable ways on more localised levels (Ringold  
et al. 2012). 
 
Pursuing the long accountability route can be very challenging, especially in countries with 
weak state structures, as there are substantial institutional requirements. Citizens must be 
able to effectively articulate their needs, either as individuals or collectively, which states 
must then adequately capture and respond to (Camargo 2011). Too often failed by the ballot 
box, the needs of poor and marginalised groups are frequently ignored or de-prioritised. 
States’ tendencies to exclude these groups have been counteracted through forms of social 
accountability (discussed earlier) to elevate ‘citizen voice’ through formal and informal 
mechanisms by which citizens express their preferences, opinions and views and demand 
accountability from power-holders. As Goetz and Gaventa (2001) suggest, these 
mechanisms can include complaint, organised protest, lobbying and participation in decision-
making, product delivery or policy implementation.5 However, in situations where democracy 
is restricted – such as in states with centralised decision-making structures and authoritarian 
leanings – citizen voice may be totally disregarded by policymakers, or opportunities for 
exercising voice may be unequally distributed across social groups. Informal institutional 
norms, such as tendencies towards clientelism (Camargo and Jacobs 2011) or cultural 
interpretations of which voices are valuable, can deepen this crisis of voice (Couldry 2010) 
and reinforce the invisibility of the least advantaged groups to those in the higher echelons of 
power. 
 
Even when states are more politically receptive to democratic processes, they may not have 
the institutional capacity to encourage citizen voice such as by setting up participatory 
channels, or to respond to voice even when actively exercised by citizens. Ultimately, the 
institutional space required for this multi-tiered relationship – which exists between citizens, 
between citizens and the state, and between the state and providers6 – to work is expansive, 
expensive, and requires adequate incentives and resources. This involves many different 
political and bureaucratic actors in a chain of command that can be subject to frequent 
upheaval and high turnover of public officials in key decision-making roles. It has been 
                                                          
5  According to Goetz and Gaventa (2001), voice matters for four related reasons: (1) from the perspective of civil and 
political rights, voice has intrinsic value – it is good for people to have the freedom to express their beliefs and 
preferences; (2) if people do not speak up, there is little or no chance that their preferences, opinions and views will be 
reflected in government priorities and policies; (3) voice is an essential building block for accountability – for a power-
holder to respond, s/he must be answering an expressed need or desire. However, this is a two-way relationship in that 
accountability can also encourage voice by demonstrating that exercising voice can make a difference; (4) the 
interaction between groups and individuals who exercise voice helps communities arrive collectively at the standards, 
values and norms of justice and morality against which the actions of others will be judged. 
6  Relationships between citizens, the state and providers are not the only ones that matter. Indeed, there may be many 
accountability relationships among different state-based organisations that provide checks and balances for one another 
(O’Donnell 1998). The functioning of these internal accountability processes is also important to overall accountability in 
health systems.  
15 
 
argued that the long route to accountability is thus difficult to sustain, taking a long time for 
issues – including urgent health crises – to move towards resolution, and offering little 
opportunity for citizens to witness the results of their expression of needs or desire for 
change. 
 
4.2 The short accountability route 
The difficulties and possible logjams associated with various forms of state failure in the long 
accountability route have led to arguments for strengthening the short accountability route 
(World Bank 2004). This approach, emphasising the ‘demand side’, sees citizens directly 
interacting with local-level public officials and service providers to insist on improved service 
delivery through either market exit, or the exercise of voice (Camargo 2011). 
 
The market exit theory – that citizens can apply pressure to poorly performing public 
providers by opting instead for market alternatives – rests on assumptions that, for reasons 
explained earlier in this paper, cannot be taken for granted in health systems in LMICs. This 
strategy requires that viable market alternatives exist, that citizens have sufficient knowledge 
to know when providers are being negligent, and that they are able to absorb the costs of 
switching. These and other market failures mean that this is not always an available tactic, 
especially for poor people (Bloom et al. 2008). And should there be options, there are 
numerous challenges to regulating health markets in LMICs, and to ensuring that such 
markets work for rather than exploit or exclude poor and marginalised populations (Bloom   
et al. 2012). 
 
The second short route tactic – arguably a more viable one in the context of health systems 
in LMICs – is the exercise of citizen voice, which has been discussed earlier in the context of 
social accountability and citizen voice strategies as related to the long route. Once again, 
however, this strategy requires that citizens are both sufficiently empowered to exercise 
voice, and that service providers have incentives to listen and respond. Ultimately, both 
these variables hinge on the wider political and institutional environment as discussed in the 
long route, including the degree of democracy in the political system, the centralisation of 
decision-making, the institutional incentives for public officials and providers, and the 
capacity of citizens to exercise voice. Even if providers are incentivised to respond, the 
unequal distribution of voice due to social, economic, cultural and political marginalisation 
may mean that the needs of the vulnerable remain unheard and unaddressed (McGee and 
Gaventa 2011). 
 
Thus, in practice, initiatives based on short route accountability – understood as the localised 
targeting of providers and officials through citizen voice initiatives alone – have not proven a 
panacea. Government failures must also be addressed, and efforts must be made to ensure 
that initiatives do not themselves reproduce local power structures that exclude the poor 
(Devarajan et al. 2014). Furthermore, if poor people do not believe that exercising voice will 
result in change, they are unlikely to take on the effort and costs necessary to do so. 
 
Recognising the limitations of ‘society-side’ interventions singularly focused on bolstering 
citizen voice to target providers, Fox argues for ‘“sandwich strategies’’ of mutually 
empowering coalitions of pro-accountability actors in both state and society’ to ‘trigger the 
virtuous circles of mutual empowerment that are needed to break out of “low accountability 
traps”’ (2015: 347). Such strategies aim to simultaneously strengthen both ‘voice’ (citizen 
capacity to effectively communicate demands) and ‘teeth’ (the ability of states to enforce 
sanctions on providers). This entails creating enabling environments for collective actions for 
accountability and coordinating citizen voice initiatives alongside institutional reforms that 
bolster public sector capacity and responsiveness at various vertical and horizontal planes of 
government. This more holistic and strategic approach holds more promise for sustainably 
addressing institutional incentives, and ensuring that the concerns of poor and marginalised 
groups are meaningfully taken on board. 
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5 The characteristics of health services 
Although it is widely recognised that politics affect public service performance, very little 
research attempts to analyse the political implications of the nature of services themselves. 
In contrast to the institutional perspective described above, the service characteristics 
approach refocuses the lens onto the nature of health-care services and citizens’ use thereof 
to assess challenges to and opportunities for accountability. 
 
Batley and Mcloughlin focus on the interaction between public services and politics to 
emphasise how overlapping and intersecting market-related, demand-related and task-
related characteristics of particular services affect, and are affected by, political dynamics 
relevant to accountability. These dynamics include the incentives for politicians to commit to 
health services, the ways in which control and monitoring is managed by service providers 
and public officials, and the scope for, and voicing of, citizen demand for improved services 
(Batley and Mcloughlin 2015). 
 
Harris et al. (2014) explore the implications of these characteristics in the health sector 
specifically, pointing out that different types and subtypes of health care have diverse 
characteristics and politics that, in turn, have varying implications for accountability. They 
distinguish between curative and preventive care. Curative care includes subtypes that range 
from emergency care to non-critical routine health visits (such as for a rash or stomach 
complaint), to chronic long-term care. Preventive care encompasses public health efforts that 
promote more diffuse positive externalities. Primary health care that is not curative – such as 
regular check-ups and vaccinations for children, routine breast cancer screening and even 
maternal health care – are technically preventive, but as they are accessed individually, they 
have much in common with the curative care category. 
 
Critical and emergency health care, also in the category of curative care, present the 
greatest challenges for accountability. Relating to demand, these services are required in 
moments of crisis when decisions to receive care are literally life or death situations. This 
inevitably undermines accountability mechanisms that rely on citizens having adequate time, 
bargaining power and information to consider alternative providers or treatments should 
these options even be available. Furthermore, emergency care is usually sought in hospitals 
serving very large geographical areas, and patients’ needs are highly variable – sometimes 
focused on individual problems (broken limbs, stroke, heart attacks, accidents) and 
sometimes on communal crises (such as earthquakes, epidemics and other natural 
disasters). Thus, when seeking emergency care, users who arrive at hospital from diverse 
locations lack shared experience and opportunities for collective action. During health 
disasters experienced at community or regional levels, users are focused on immediate 
individual and family needs, rather than on collective health priorities despite perhaps having 
similar health issues. The potential for user mobilisation for improved care is higher when 
services are ‘used regularly, predictably and within a certain territory’ (Batley and Harris 
2014: 9). 
 
While accountability issues are most acute in emergency services, such dilemmas are also 
faced to a lesser degree in other forms of curative health care. Most curative care, such as 
would be sought in a primary health facility, also tends to be infrequently required, making it 
difficult for users to evaluate service providers. As Chaudhury et al. state, when comparing 
accountability in health systems to that of education: 
 
If a teacher does not show up regularly, a class full of pupils, and potentially their 
parents, will know about it. On the other hand, it is much harder for patients, who 
presumably come to health care centres irregularly, to know if a particular health care 
worker is absent frequently. 
(2006: 97, cited in Harris et al. 2014: 3) 
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Moreover, patients often lack adequate knowledge about health conditions, potential 
treatments, and thus what appropriate care might look like. Their lack of health-specific 
knowledge when compared with specially trained health-care professionals creates a 
situation characterised by a high level of information asymmetry. This asymmetry limits 
patients’ ability to judge quality and performance of health-care professionals; people may 
not know what the ‘right’ kind of health care is, or what conditions shape the need for this or 
alternative care (Brinkerhoff 2004; Ringold et al. 2012). This information asymmetry (Bloom 
et al. 2008) and the highly variable nature of health conditions that citizens seek care for are 
key characteristics of health services resulting in high discretion of frontline staff. This makes 
it difficult not only for patients to evaluate care, but also for managers and public officials to 
monitor provider performance, which clearly has implications in terms of who holds who 
accountable and how assessments of ‘appropriate’ distribution of health services are made. 
 
Information asymmetry also interacts with socioeconomic inequalities in ways that mean 
less-educated members of society will likely have even less information about their health 
conditions and what constitutes appropriate care (Loewenson 2008). This may create 
perverse incentives for service providers and politicians to channel better services and care 
to users who are better informed, while less-informed users will not have sufficient 
information or political power to challenge poor service. This could potentially lead to a 
vicious circle where services remain stagnant for the least informed and most marginalised 
groups while they continue to improve for better-informed groups. And when the more 
advantaged citizens simply opt out of public health-care provision in favour of private options, 
such as (for example) in Brazil (Do Rosário Costa and Vaitsman 2014), political support for 
stronger public services is diminished as it is no longer of direct relevance to politically 
influential citizens. Publicly provided services can then become mired in low accountability 
traps. 
 
Preventive care, in the sense of broader public health initiatives, like emergency care, also 
suffers from particular accountability challenges. The positive health externalities of say, 
vector control measures, needle exchanges for drug users, or critical levels of child 
vaccinations are not easily attributed to the efforts of politicians. Rather, elected politicians 
are incentivised to support those aspects of services that are more visible and which can be 
easily linked to their efforts (Eldon, Waddington and Hadi, 2008). Building hospitals or clinics, 
for example, is far more visible and immediate than making investments in public health, the 
benefits of which are diffuse and may take a long time to become evident. Less visible 
measures associated with health care generally, such as the establishment of internal 
mechanisms and reforms to increase provider capacity and accountability, likewise suffer 
from this dilemma of political non-commitment. 
 
In contrast to emergency and preventive public health care, longer-term chronic care, such 
as for people with HIV, diabetes or other chronic conditions, may facilitate accountability 
more readily. As these patients need to manage their conditions, are regularly in contact with 
the health system and experience more or less standardised visits over time, they may 
develop a sense of appropriate care. Advocacy and patient support groups may also 
facilitate networking that further enhances patients’ knowledge about their health conditions 
and what constitutes quality care. These spaces may also create opportunities for collective 
action and the exercise of citizen voice, although further investigation into these possibilities 
is warranted (Harris et al. 2014). 
 
As repetitive encounters with health systems create opportunities for patients with chronic 
illnesses to become familiar not just with each other but with their conditions and appropriate 
care, it follows that linking patients with similar concerns may hold promise for similarly 
overcoming information asymmetry, even when the health concerns in question are not 
matters of chronic illness. Linking community members around issues of maternal and child 
health concerns may, for example, create opportunities for collective action to improve 
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accountability, and thus health (Papp, Gogoi and Campbell 2013). Such citizen groups, 
supported by civil society, might directly lobby providers and local officials for better services 
to incentivise them to perform, seek to actively monitor information and health outcomes, 
and/or work strategically with state actors and even international actors in mutually 
reinforcing ‘sandwich strategies’ (Fox 2015). 
 
 
6 mHealth and accountability 
In light of the accountability challenges presented by institutional factors in LMICs, and the 
unique characteristics of different types of health services themselves, where and how have 
mHealth initiatives worked to strengthen accountability? 
 
Mobile phones and mHealth have made citizens who were previously remote and difficult to 
access far more contactable (Hall et al. 2014). Much of the excitement of mHealth has been 
focused on its potential to improve health system delivery. This includes using mobile phones 
to: report on pharmaceutical stock-outs (Ringold et al. 2012); develop reliable statistics on 
pregnancy, birth outcomes and corresponding health services; enhance citizens’ health-
seeking behaviours and educate them on desirable health-related lifestyle choices (Labrique 
et al. 2012; Hall et al. 2014). mHealth thus has the potential to enhance health systems 
through the dissemination of health information, through helping patients manage their own 
health conditions and reducing their dependence on health service providers, and by 
improving the quality of health care through improved data collection (Lucas 2015). 
 
Labrique and colleagues have argued that mHealth strategies should be considered integral 
to health systems, and not as ‘siloed, standalone solutions’ (Labrique et al. 2013: 160). 
Mobile phone applications (or apps) are changing, and have the potential to radically 
enhance health information dissemination in many areas, including: behavioural change; 
remote monitoring of patients’ conditions (using mobile-based diagnostic tests); the 
maintenance of registries; data collection; the provision and accessibility of patients’ health 
records; health system decision-making (through the application of algorithms, protocols and 
checklists); human resource management; supply chain management; health system 
planning and scheduling; and service provider training and communication between different 
providers (Labrique et al. 2013). As Loewenson argues, mHealth and other forms of 
information technology have also made possible more direct scrutiny of health systems’ 
allocations, prioritisations and other decisions. This in turn has raised questions about 
whether the allocation of resources is equitable, about whose interests are being met and 
about the legitimacy of decisions around these issues (Loewenson 2008). In order to assess 
the role of mHealth in relation to health systems and accountability, the following section 
draws on the approaches outlined above, exploring the role of new technology in relation to 
institutions (both long and short routes for accountability). 
 
6.1 mHealth and the long route to accountability 
mHealth has been particularly influential in maternal and neonatal health, an area in which, in 
LMICs’ health systems, reliable data does not always exist. This has implications for 
accountability. The highest mortality burden occurs when mothers give birth at home with no 
skilled midwife in attendance. However, countries have not, to date, been able to routinely 
collect reliable information and statistics on pregnancy and have not included this in health 
management information. Health systems have instead relied on analytical models derived 
from population samples and household surveys. This lack of information, poor health 
system infrastructure and the socioeconomic conditions experienced in rural and remote 
areas has hampered the delivery of routine antenatal care and prevented data collection that 
could ‘make every death count’ (Labrique et al. 2012: 113). 
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mHealth offers radical new possibilities in terms of the potential to collect information in 
timely, accessible ways and across wide, often remote, contexts (Labrique et al. 2012). In 
LMICs (where, until recently, mHealth data-gathering services have not been available), the 
inaccessibility of rural areas, the existence of multiple databases, and degraded paper-based 
systems are among the challenges that inhibit the collation of good, reliable data for maternal 
and neonatal health. The information that has been relied upon has often been based on 
specific subpopulations, containing suspect, outdated data. This has made it difficult to 
identify trends and performance patterns, and has, in the past, led to late and ineffective 
health system responses. This lack of data means that ‘accountability coverage becomes the 
point of entry for mHealth interventions’ (Mehl and Labrique 2014: 1285). 
 
mHealth applications have massively enhanced the potential of the state as agent in an 
accountability relationship (Brinkerhoff 2004) to ascertain the health needs of its citizens. 
mHealth apps have, in recent years, been used to facilitate civil registration and vital 
statistics (CRVs) mechanisms, generate population-level data, and generate national 
electronic medical records (EMRs), overcoming the challenges of inaccessibility and of 
outdated and multiple data-collection systems. These data can be collected in multiple, 
connected ways. For instance, community members can use their mobile phones to provide 
information on births, enabling registration and certification of babies. Increasingly, health 
workers use mobile phones or tablets that are connected to national EMR registers, and 
which have a series of apps enabling them to keep and access individual patients’ health 
records; this means they can offer better health services and the data can also generate 
information that can be used to predict epidemiological trends (Labrique et al. 2013). 
 
Using mHealth apps in relation to maternal health has facilitated the collection of national-
level data, for example, in Uganda, Bangladesh and South Africa. The development of ‘well-
designed, community-based pregnancy surveillance and registration systems’ and the 
provision of population-level data on maternal health needs and the extent to which these are 
(un)met, ‘make it possible for accountability to be enhanced and resource/service delivery 
gaps to be identified’ (Labrique et al. 2012: 114; Batavia and Kaonga 2014). mHealth has 
been shown to generate improved and expanded health statistics, which enable states to be 
better informed on the health needs of their populations, including poor and frequently 
overlooked groups, and which, in turn should (politics permitting) facilitate the design of 
better and more appropriate health policy and allocation of resources. 
 
In this sense, mHealth does make a significant contribution in the form of information-
gathering mechanisms that can be made transparent to citizens and can help states to 
design policy that addresses specific needs and to measure performance against stated 
goals. However, while this enhances the capacity of states to ensure functioning health 
systems through better and more accessible information, it does not meet all the conditions 
of accountability. As McGee and Gaventa (2011) argue, information alone does not counter 
the perverse incentives felt by politicians, public officials or service providers if it cannot 
trigger disciplinary action when necessary. Moreover, the vast majority of mHealth initiatives 
have been pilot studies that have not been successfully applied at scale, have been 
disconnected from national-level initiatives and have, more often than not, increased 
governments’ workloads without adequate returns (Franz-Vasdeki et al. 2015). 
 
Over the past couple of years, however, large-scale and/or national-level mHealth initiatives 
have begun to emerge in LMICs such as Rwanda (Ngabo et al. 2012), Uganda (Cummins 
and Huddleston 2013; Franz-Vasdeki et al. 2015), Ghana (Otto et al. 2015), Tanzania 
(Mangone et al. 2016) and elsewhere. In 2014, South Africa introduced a national, free 
mHealth service for all pregnant women and new mothers in order to reduce maternal and 
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child mortality (Seebregts et al. 2016).7 MomConnect uses mobile phones and SMS 
messages to provide pregnant women and mothers with regular information and advice on 
their pregnancy and/or newly-born children. It was developed by a team of experts in health, 
mobile communications and maternal and child health communication, and implemented 
through a public–private collaborative partnership, with non-profit and private organisations 
working directly with the National Department of Health (Waldman and Stevens 2015). This 
mHealth programme aims to: (a) enroll all pregnant women in South Africa, providing each 
with a unique registration number, through even the most basic mobile phones; (b) develop 
South Africa’s first national electronic pregnancy register; (c) use SMS messages to 
encourage behavioural change, improve clinical outcomes and identify high-risk behaviour; 
(d) offer a helpdesk which enables women to ask questions, evaluate and report their 
experiences of health services; and (e) provide health staff with regular updates and clinical 
information that helps them and facilitates their reporting to higher-level managers (Peter, 
Barron and Pillay 2016; Waldman and Stevens 2015). 
 
More than 34,000 health workers were trained to register women on MomConnect, and more 
than 500,000 women were registered in its first year. Nearly 80,000 women completed 
surveys ranking their first antenatal visit in terms of cleanliness, friendliness, privacy and the 
length of time they had to wait. ‘Over 3,000 mothers complimented the services and 500 
complained, a ratio of six compliments to every complaint. More than 180,000 questions 
were answered through the help desk’ (Peter et al. 2016: 1). There is widespread support for 
MomConnect, with 98 per cent of the 10,000 women surveyed in 2015 saying that the SMS 
messages were helpful and 78 per cent reporting that they were better prepared for 
childbirth. Yet other constraints were raised: even in urban areas, not all mothers had mobile 
phones or electricity to charge phones, and those that did were not always able to use their 
phones in ways which enabled them to benefit from MomConnect; many were illiterate and 
not able to read the SMS messages and, despite being offered in six languages, not all 
women were able to understand the health messages (Wolff-Piggott and Rivett 2016). These 
realities highlight how ICTs, while full of potential, are not a panacea for poor or marginalised 
groups and can even reproduce socioeconomic inequalities. Furthermore, clinic staff saw the 
time required for MomConnect registrations as an additional distraction, preventing them 
from completing more important work (rather than a means of saving time) and as 
undermining their professional status (rather than enhancing their capacity for professional 
service) (Wolff-Piggott 2016). Moreover, the compliments and complaints channel was 
something which made clinic staff uneasy. 
 
MomConnect has ‘drawn global attention due to its innovative features and its avoidance of 
many of the common pitfalls when implementing digital health projects at scale in low-
resource settings’ (Seebregts et al. 2016: 125). In doing all of the above, it has also 
massively enhanced the scope for long-route accountability. It has revolutionised the 
National Department of Health’s database and overcome challenges of interoperability, 
making up-to-date information readily available to health officials and policymakers who can 
now assess questions of need and distribution (cf. Goetz and Jenkins 2005; Moore and 
Teskey 2006; Akpanuko and Asogwa 2013). It has made it possible for the South African 
Department of Health to reach far more pregnant women and mothers of young children than 
ever before, and to stay connected with them on a regular basis. It has also: promoted early 
antenatal care; facilitated the delivery of health information to pregnant women; reminded 
them to visit local clinics for check-ups at critical moments; helped identify potential 
complications (such as hypertension, HIV/AIDS and diabetes) early on; provided a way for 
mothers to ask questions of health service providers; and enhanced the state’s ability to track 
migrant and mobile mothers, massively improving South Africa’s electronic database and 
medical registry (cf. Bateman 2014). Moreover, it has provided an avenue – albeit limited – 
                                                          
7  South Africa’s maternal mortality rate (MMR) was estimated at 155 deaths per 100,000 live births in 2013 and the 
National Department of Health has a target of 100 or fewer deaths per 100,000 live births for 2020. 
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for citizen voice as women and mothers were consulted in the design phase and through the 
feedback system. 
 
MomConnect is not the only example; there are others, usually on a smaller scale, in which 
mHealth has shown its potential to address accountability challenges of this sort. For 
example, the government of Malawi used child nutrition indicators, submitted by community 
health workers to a central server through SMS messages and automatically analysed, to 
identify cases of malnutrition and send responses, thereby omitting the usual delays 
experienced when relying on paper-based systems. Pilot mHealth initiatives in Uganda, 
Senegal and Brazil, which provided mobile phones and appropriate apps to health workers, 
showed birth registration improving to nearly 100 per cent (Hall et al. 2014). 
 
In addition to facilitating better information flow on the health needs of the population, long-
route accountability also involves a second step: the creation of appropriate incentives to 
ensure that the health needs of the population are addressed by providers. Here, the state 
acts as the principal, providing resources, and putting in place mechanisms and processes to 
incentivise and/or discipline health service providers who act as the responsible agents. 
 
mHealth can also play a role in this process. The South African government has published 
the main complaints received through MomConnect on its website and presented summaries 
of negative feedback in high-level, political speeches (namely inappropriate treatment of 
patients by service providers; extended waiting times; and drug shortages); it has identified 
the clinics or health institutions where problems have occurred, and has either explained 
what action has been taken to address these problems or how it plans to address them 
(Motsoaledi 2015a). While to some extent, these complaints or problems had already been 
acknowledged (Motsoaledi 2015b), MomConnect has facilitated the identification of ‘key 
institutional junctures’, or what Camargo (2011) and Carmargo and Jacobs (2011) would 
term ‘points of accountability failure’, and has sought to address these. However, in this and 
similar contexts, as it is a government exercising discretion over what comments are 
published, and what information is presented to the public, the possibility of the same 
government undertaking meaningful accountability may be reduced. It could also be using an 
ostensibly ‘neutral’ technological platform to make the government appear to be acting 
accountably while actually doing very little. 
 
mHealth innovations have also offered creative new ways of addressing key institutional 
junctures where accountability failures occur such as by focusing on community health 
workers, frontline workers, community birth attendants or other community-based workers. 
For instance, in Pakistan, an mHealth campaign reported enhanced tuberculosis (TB) 
detection rates. This combined a wide-scale health information campaign encouraging 
people who had a persistent cough to visit medical facilities with the training of community 
members who assessed visitors’ potential TB risk using a mobile phone-based algorithm. 
These workers were then incentivised through immediate financial rewards for positive 
identifications (Hall et al. 2014). 
 
mHealth initiatives which address the availability of health resources and stocks have relied 
on mobile phone-based innovations combined with financial incentives (Shieshia et al. 2014). 
New financial arrangements are also being used to ‘reduce the time to distribute 
compensation, performance incentives and/or travel reimbursements’ to health workers who 
would previously have suffered from delayed and intermittent payments, boosting their 
morale and reducing the need for informal payments (Batavia and Kaonga 2014: 12). 
mHealth initiatives are also increasingly being coupled with developments in mobile phone 
banking, to leverage better health gains (Mehl and Labrique 2014; Labrique et al. 2013). In 
Zanzibar, Tanzania, for example, successful and safe births are rewarded through financial 
perks for relevant birth attendants who use a particular mHealth app to register pregnant 
women, undertake risk assessments and offer birth planning information. The same mobile 
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phone app transfers funds to the birth attendant to transport pregnant mothers to medical 
facilities for safe childbirth, and distributes financial incentives to those attendants that 
perform well (Batavia and Kaonga 2014: 12). 
 
As mentioned, mHealth apps and innovations are in their infancy, and many of the examples 
cited above are pilots. Research has not yet caught up with practice and it is difficult to say 
with certainty at this point to what extent these innovations are actually transforming 
accountability, and making health services work better not only for already advantaged 
citizens, but also for poor and marginalised groups. Long-term effects and unintended 
consequences remain underexplored. Nevertheless, as demonstrated here, it is clear that 
mHealth has much potential for enhancing the long route to accountability. It can provide 
‘accurate, population-based numerators and denominators [which] can help to improve 
accountability of the health system to provide expected routine antenatal and post-natal care, 
as well as emergency support and referral, as needed’ (Labrique et al. 2012: 113) as well as 
offering creative incentives and processes that encourage a range of health service providers 
to heed the needs of their populations in ways that overcome some previously experienced 
challenges. 
 
In addition to acting as a tool for better information collection on the health needs of the 
population, often through the discretion of community-based health workers and staff, some 
mHealth platforms also directly connect patients to the state and providers, allowing them to 
report on their own experiences of the health system. All this new and more accurate data 
can then be used by the state to more effectively design policy, allocate resources and 
generally improve its administration to health service providers. However, while mHealth can 
dramatically enhance the transfer of information from citizens to the upper layers of the state, 
and offers new and creative tools that can be used to incentivise and discipline providers, it 
does not necessarily guarantee that such information or tools will be effectively translated 
into more accountable relationships and better health outcomes. As discussed further below, 
contextual politics and power relations also play a significant role and may ultimately 
determine the impact of mHealth initiatives in any given setting. 
 
6.2 mHealth and the short route to accountability 
Accountability, as envisaged through the short route, puts patients directly in touch with local 
service providers and emphasises patients’ and others’ ability to demand appropriate and 
decent health services directly from them without engaging state actors at a higher or 
national level. Enhancing service provision at the local level is an area where mHealth may 
have great potential, although few mHealth initiatives are exclusively and directly focused on 
accountability. Instead, mHealth focuses on improving health outcomes through a wide range 
of opportunities leveraged through new technologies. Again, many of these mHealth 
initiatives are pilots which have not – for a variety of structural, institutional, financial and 
other reasons – been delivered at scale, even though they may have proven to be successful 
in terms of meeting their primary aims (Otto et al. 2015). mHealth potentially enhances 
service provision and thus has implications for accountability in the areas of: the marketability 
of health provision; health information dissemination; finding ways to provide health services 
to remote rural communities; and health worker training and support. Each of these is 
discussed in turn below. 
 
The availability of health markets can provide an effective means of short-route 
accountability, with citizens simply choosing other providers when they are not satisfied. 
While this is not often a viable strategy in health systems for reasons discussed above, 
mHealth is creating new health markets that will, in the long term, shape health systems. 
 
According to a report from MarketsandMarkets, the global mHealth market is predicted 
to grow from $6.21 billion in revenue in 2013 to $23.49 billion by 2018 at a compound 
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annual growth rate (CAGR) of 30.5 percent over the five-year-period from 2013 to 
2018. The mobile fitness and wellness market is expected to grow at a CAGR of 36.7 
percent from 2013 to 2018. This rising mHealth market threatens changes in the way 
significant amounts of health data will be managed, with a paradigm shift from 
mainframe systems located in the facilities of healthcare providers to apps on mobiles 
and storage in shared cloud services. This trend is paralleled by a new openness in 
which devices that were once only available in hospitals become widely available to 
individuals while flexible mHealth applications tempt clinicians away from the hospital-
based systems they used in the past. This popular market will disruptively challenge 
traditional approaches by being cheap and accessible. 
(He et al. 2014: 1) 
 
While most of this growth is occurring in high-income countries (HICs), there is substantial 
evidence of private sector interests in mHealth markets in LMICs as well (Akter, Ray and 
D’Ambra 2013). As Bloom et al. have argued, formal and informal private sector markets 
have become increasingly significant in the health systems of LMICs: 
 
This has been both a formal process, sanctioned by the state through contracts with 
not-for-profit providers and legislation allowing the development of the private health 
care market, and an informal process with burgeoning numbers of unlicensed 
practitioners, pharmacists and drug pedlars increasingly providing services. 
(Bloom et al. 2008: 2079). 
 
In LMIC contexts of pluralistic markets, there has been considerable exploration of the 
viability of mHealth to market lifestyle and health-related products, with little regulatory 
oversight (Ahmed et al. 2014; Lucas 2013). In Bangladesh, for example, all mobile phone 
companies offer added-value content to subscribers through the provision of health helplines, 
which offer both telephonic advice and SMS messaging. The first of these, established by 
Grameenphone in 2006, charged premium rates for a three-minute consultation with a 
medical doctor, conducting 11 million such consultations between 2006 and 2011 (Ahmed   
et al. 2014). mHealth helpline or hotline services have become increasingly popular in LMICs 
and are available in different formats in India, Mexico, Bangladesh and South Africa (Akter  
et al. 2013). 
 
Similar initiatives have been witnessed in other countries, sometimes in partnership with 
governments and sometimes not. In Kenya, the country’s largest mobile phone operator, 
Safaricom, has partnered with a private company, Changamka Microhealth Ltd, to provide 
health-related finance products for poor citizens (Otto et al. 2015). This follows a recent focus 
on mHealth as a product marketable to the poor – or to those at the ‘bottom of the economic 
pyramid’ – and in the ‘low income electronic markets’ experienced in LMICs (Akter et al. 
2013). Sarwar warns that, in Bangladesh, a new form of health market system may be 
looming, which involves private companies in the ‘conceptualisation, marketing and financing 
of health services’. He asks whether this signals ‘a transformation to new market systems for 
health service delivery’ and whether this may have negative implications for people living in 
poverty (Sarwar 2015). 
 
The accountability aspects of such market-related mHealth innovations remain nascent, with 
little theorisation or empirical evidence to date. And while it is too early to posit with any 
certainty, such market transformations may offer poor people opportunities to ‘shop around’ 
for quality alternative health provision with the assistance of mHealth, but may also result in 
further financial exploitation through the sale of sub-standard, inappropriate or ineffectual 
medical drugs and solutions.  It may also undermine health systems’ ‘public goods’ aims, and 
lead to low accountability traps with decreasing political commitment to improving public 
services when and if larger proportions of the population opt for private care. Such emerging 
market-based arrangements also beg questions about private sector motives and 
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accountability in relation to data collected through mobile phone-based health apps. 
Proprietary rights to population health data can undermine and even undercut state efforts to 
improve publicly provided health services, while companies might attempt to profit from the 
sale of these data to other private or public entities, or use the data to exploit poor people. 
 
Another area where mHealth can excel is in health information dissemination. Digital 
technology, the ubiquity of mobile phones and the relatively low cost of SMS messages have 
provided novel ways of broadcasting health information and of encouraging behaviour 
change (Labrique et al. 2013). Picked up by governments to ensure ‘targeted, timely health 
education and actionable health information’, this technology goes a long way towards 
making access to health information and health service provision easier, better and more 
satisfying (Labrique et al. 2013: 161). In Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania, for example, 
governments have introduced SMS-based health communications programmes, entitled 
m4RH (or Mobile for Reproductive Health), which provide government-approved 
contraception and family planning information through SMS messaging to young people. In 
Tanzania, when promoted as part of a national family planning programme, m4RH sent 
messages to 50,000 people in a three-month period. 
 
There is evidence that m4RH may be able to address a longstanding health systems 
concern, namely young people’s lack of access to clinics and inadequate contraceptive 
knowledge (Otto et al. 2015; Vahdat et al. 2013; Mangone et al. 2016). Aponjon, or MAMA 
(Mobile Alliance for Maternal Action) is another, oft-cited example from Bangladesh, which 
focuses on ensuring the delivery of appropriate maternal health information to pregnant 
women, new mothers, their husbands and other influential people (such as mothers or 
mothers-in-law). This public–private initiative works with community health workers to 
encourage women to subscribe and then to receive stage-appropriate information through 
either SMS messaging or instant voice-recorded messaging. In March 2014, 1.2 million 
subscribers were registered with Aponjon, which aims to reach 2 million mothers in order to 
ensure financial viability. 
 
As is the case in m4RH in Rwanda, Tanzania and Kenya, or MomConnect in South Africa, 
the government of Bangladesh is an official partner and the messages sent out are approved 
by ‘an expert panel consisting of Bangladeshi physicians, researchers and communications 
professionals’ (Sarwar 2015; Rajan et al. 2013). As with many other mHealth initiatives, 
Aponjon claims to demonstrate positive health outcomes, such as improved antenatal 
attendance at clinics and increased breastfeeding, but long-term outcomes and improved 
national health statistics are not yet available. Furthermore, as stressed above, due to the 
relative infancy of mHealth technologies, interventions and related research, reports of 
positive outcomes – especially from small-scale pilot projects – should be treated with 
skepticism until more critical, long-term assessments can be made. 
 
While targeted programmes such as Aponjon and m4RH are intended to make patients more 
knowledgeable about their conditions, treatment and care (WHO Global Observatory for 
eHealth 2011), the express intention is not to reduce information asymmetry and to help 
patients make judgements about the kinds of treatments they receive but to enhance 
adherence to medication or use of health services (Labrique et al. 2013). There has, to date, 
been little assessment of how health information dissemination can address information 
asymmetries inherent in health systems. The ‘informed patient’ model, which has become 
increasingly prevalent in HICs, in which patients (provided with up-to-date information and 
medical evidence) actively engage in determining their treatment regimens (Detmer et al. 
2003), remains absent from LMIC mHealth information dissemination programmes. The 
notion that patient knowledge of health, acquired through mHealth technologies, helps 
address accountability issues remains underdeveloped. 
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mHealth initiatives have also made it easier for people to search for health information 
themselves – whether accurate or not. As Hampshire et al. and Batchelor et al. make clear, 
much of this searching does not involve consulting with members of the health sector. 
Instead, mobile phones are being used to connect families, relatives and other social 
contacts, and for a widened scope of health information-seeking, which includes not just 
understanding the nature of a particular illness but also identifying appropriate health 
services and exploring what resources are available for treatment (Hampshire et al. 2011; 
Hampshire et al. 2015; Batchelor et al. 2015). Technological innovations have also made it 
possible for mobile phone owners to access the internet, creating a myriad of possibilities for 
individuals to seek health information. Some of this may happen through non health-related 
social media websites or forums where this information (or sometimes, misinformation) is 
shared and accessed, but there have also been many online initiatives specifically related to 
health. For instance, many of these have been directed at young people and sexual health 
(Waldman and Amazon-Brown 2017). While most of these initiatives are targeted at 
individuals who use their mobile phones to interact with specialised online knowledge 
providers (for example, by asking questions, sending opinions or completing surveys), a few 
seek to create online communities with peer-to-peer interaction. Such initiatives offer 
potential to bring people together collectively, but are characterised by privacy and 
anonymity (influenced as they are by the sensitive topic of sexual health), by the exclusive 
transmission of health information rather than a focus on service delivery and, on occasion, 
by the depoliticisation of health. All of these factors reduce the scope for these online 
mHealth communities to generate collective voice and articulate accountability concerns. 
Yet, mobile technologies have also been used to survey young people and to create forums 
in which they express their opinions in relation to policy. For example, in 2014, Zambian 
youths’ views on sex education were solicited through mobile phones and presented to 
representatives from health systems, governments, and international donors at the 
Adolescents’ Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights, Gender-Based Violence and HIV in 
Africa Symposium (Waldman and Amazon-Brown 2017). 
 
mHealth has also provided innovative solutions to overcome the challenges of geographic 
remoteness, poor transport routes and other financial and infrastructural deficits in rural 
areas in LMICs. Here, ICT is being used to ‘extend the reach of health facilities into the 
community and into clients’ homes’, sometimes simply through the connectivity offered by 
mobile phones, but sometimes through linking mobile phones to other external devices that 
enable sophisticated medical assessments and data collection (Labrique et al. 2013: 163). 
For example, the Ghana Medical Association instituted a system which allowed physicians 
across the country to phone each other and communicate without having to pay for the cost 
of the call. The Mobile Doctors Network (MDNet)/Medicareline programme, or MDNet for 
short, allowed all registered doctors to use this service, enabling them to communicate with 
others during emergencies, get peer advice and, as a later addition, receive SMS messages 
about national health issues (WHO Global Observatory for eHealth 2011). In so doing, it 
offered (in theory and providing that doctors used it as envisaged) an improved health 
service delivery to rural patients. 
 
A more sophisticated example is the Reseau en Afrique Francophone pour la Telemedecine 
or RAFT initiative, conceptualised by Geneva University Hospitals, which uses digital 
technologies to increase the potential for doctors in isolated areas to connect to regional 
hospitals (Otto et al. 2015). It provides opportunities for medical practitioners to discuss and 
assess ‘complicated cases’, at times using sophisticated technology such as tele-
ultrasonograpy or tele-cardiology, and thereby to avoid costly medical referrals or having to 
evacuate patients. RAFT also actively promotes South-South collaboration, continuing 
distance education for health professionals, and generates a sense of community among 
practitioners despite their remote locations. Having initially begun in francophone Africa, 
RAFT is becoming increasingly global and the network, consisting of 60 active sites, now 
links health professionals in Latin America, the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, using 
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French, English, Spanish and Portuguese (Bediang et al. 2015; Bagayoko et al. 2014). Other 
examples are more targeted and focus on particular medical conditions. For example, in 
Zambia, the Cervical Cancer Prevention Programme utilises trained nurses and mHealth 
technology to screen women in resource-constrained rural clinics. The screening, same-day 
treatment and decisions about referral are done by nurses who visit the clinic every three 
months. These nurses can, if necessary and if they wish to, use mobile phones and other 
technologies to consult with doctors (Mwanahamuntu et al. 2011; Parham et al. 2015). 
Parham and colleagues (2015) argue that this use of mHealth has resulted in more than 
200,000 women being screened between 2006 and 2015, representing a massive increase 
in the identification of cervical cancer and follow-up treatment. Such initiatives are significant 
in terms of their potential for: preventive care, helping to ensure early diagnosis and 
treatment; reducing complications which stem from delayed diagnosis and which require 
expensive and sophisticated medical attention; helping people be served in their local 
settings and avoiding long and expensive travel arrangements to hospitals and other medical 
facilities. As suggested above, improvements in service delivery, facilitated by mHealth, 
indirectly address some accountability issues as more people are brought into the health 
system and providers’ capacity to deliver services is bolstered. These initiatives do not, 
however, put citizens directly in touch with local government officials or service providers in 
ways that create space for citizen voice to reflect on the governance of health provision. 
 
mHealth technologies are also being utilised to remotely manage patients’ health conditions 
and offer them opportunities to manage their own conditions. This, in keeping with the 
mHealth health information dissemination innovations discussed above, may go some way 
towards shifting the balance between patient and service provider as what was previously a 
one-way monitoring system (in which the service provider holds all the information) becomes 
a more reciprocal exchange of information (Mechael et al. 2010). For example, Medinet, an 
mHealth intervention in the Caribbean, provides diabetic and cardiovascular patients with the 
opportunity to manage their own conditions. The idea is that patients use mobile technology 
to take relevant readings (blood glucose, blood pressure, etc.) which are in turn 
communicated to health-care providers through an online web portal, enabling them to track 
individual patients’ progress and assess data across a cohort. The information is also 
presented back to patients through myDR (‘my Daily Record’), which provides feedback on 
the last reading, offers additional information on disease management, and has a help 
feature. MyDR aims, not to focus on the patients’ willpower, but rather to help patients 
develop new eating and exercise habits, and to be able to regularly see the results of these 
in their medical readings (Sultan and Mohan 2013; Sultan, Mohan and Sultan 2009). In 
Brazil, such systems have been complemented by using mobile devices to create ‘body area 
networks with various sensors that capture real-time data of patients’ (Iwaya et al. 2013: 
289). This continuous tracking of vital statistics (five-minute intervals) is connected to hospital 
wards for monitoring (Murakami et al. 2006). 
 
Personalised mHealth monitoring initiatives have the advantage that patients can continually 
track their conditions without needing to wait until they visit a doctor to discover whether they 
have made progress (in reducing cholesterol levels, for example) and, in the event of little or 
no progress, that they have to take urgent corrective action (Sultan et al. 2009). They also 
enable medical staff to monitor patients’ conditions in case an intervention is urgently 
needed. The primary aim, however, is again not to address information asymmetry, but 
rather to ensure that on a day-to-day basis, a patient is provided with sufficient knowledge to 
manage (but not diagnose, confirm treatment and prescriptions or make other high-level 
medical decisions) his or her condition. As such, it is the accountability of patients, and the 
partial shifting of responsibility from health service providers to patients, that is being 
promoted (Sultan et al. 2009) rather than the kind of accountability described earlier, which 
emphasises the responsibilities of government actors, authorities and/or service providers to 
be accountable to citizens (Camargo 2011). While this increases the potential for positive 
health outcomes on an individual basis, contributes to comprehensive health information 
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databases, enhances the capacity of providers to serve populations and contributes to 
patients becoming more knowledgeable about their own conditions, there is a danger that 
this is seen as sufficient to address a wide range of accountability failures, while ignoring 
aspects such as collective voice, distribution of resources, exclusion of certain populations, 
etc. Indeed, a striking feature of these apps is their individualised – and often personalised – 
nature. This enables specific individuals to ask and know whether they are getting the 
treatment and services that they need. What it does not allow for is an assessment of 
collective experiences of health service delivery, unless such information is collated and 
presented publicly (Peixoto and Fox 2016), nor the identification of key institutional junctures 
where accountability failures occur (Camargo 2011). 
 
Health worker training and support is an area well-populated by mHealth interventions. Using 
mobile phones and apps to replace paper systems enables community health workers to 
document people’s conditions and health needs, and to report this information digitally to 
supervisors. This facilitates real-time data collection, enhanced supervisory support, and 
offers potential to monitor and respond to specific health needs. mHealth has also promoted 
ongoing training for community health workers, and novel incentive mechanisms and 
payment schemes that overcome the challenges of delayed and irregular payments, and 
help ensure compliance with health standards (Mehl and Labrique 2014). 
 
There are numerous examples of mHealth initiatives directed at community health workers 
(see, for example, the inventory produced by Batavia and Kaonga 2014). Many initiatives 
focus on improving their ability to deliver quality care by providing them with relevant 
information and mechanisms to ensure ‘end-to-end patient management’. These include 
tools such as registration, assessment and monitoring mechanisms, work plans, learning 
modules, checklists, clinical decision support, improved incentives and cost reimbursements 
(Batavia and Kaonga 2014: 12). A classic example, often upheld as a success story, is the 
Ananya programme, implemented in certain districts in Bihar, India, in 2011, which was 
scaled up across Bihar state and launched in Odisha state two years later (Chamberlain 
2014). Aiming to improve reproductive, maternal, newborn, child and adolescent health, 
Ananya implemented a range of interventions. It focused on frontline health workers’ 
professionalism and productivity, assuming that ‘improved interactions would increase 
uptake of key health behaviours’ and on using digital technology to facilitate improved 
service provision (Borkum, Rotz and Rangarajan 2015: 1). Using mobile phones, Ananya 
health workers were able to plan home visits, monitor beneficiaries and keep up-to-date 
health records. Health workers’ mobile phones also provided animated videos and 
counselling messages that could be played to pregnant women, as well as interactive 
checklists, lists of children requiring immunisation, and learning modules for health workers 
themselves, including new ways of interacting with supervisors (Batavia and Kaonga 2014; 
Borkum et al. 2015). 
 
While many mHealth interventions help health workers improve their work, some specifically 
focus on enhancing their medical knowledge. In Senegal, for instance, a mobile phone 
approach offered ways to improve health workers’ understanding of contraceptive use and 
related side effects, which helped challenge misperceptions among patients. Using a 
combination of interactive voice response (IVR) and text messaging, health workers 
completed a refresher training module lasting eight weeks. After a three-hour orientation 
meeting in which their phones were set up and they were trained on navigating the course, 
they were able to pursue their learning remotely, in their own time and at their own pace. The 
course posed questions and offered multiple possible answers, identified the correct answer 
and then provided additional detailed information on the kinds of situations health workers 
might encounter (Diedhiou et al. 2015). The Senegalese government has endorsed the use 
of mobile phones, enacting a national Frontline Health Worker Plan to ensure that all health 
workers are provided with mobile phones and mHealth apps (Batavia and Kaonga 2014). 
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As shown in this discussion, mHealth has considerable potential to improve health system 
functioning, particularly in hard-to-reach areas, through improved performance, new forms of 
low-cost delivery, the use of technology to facilitate enhanced diagnosis and management of 
disease, expansion of health information dissemination, and novel forms of health worker 
training and support. Overall, mHealth can: 
 
 improve the capacity of the state and its institutions to assess health needs, deliver and 
monitor health services; 
 positively address on-the-ground service providers’ capacity to offer timely and 
appropriate services; 
 provide mechanisms that enhance patients’ capacity to interact with the health system 
in ways that enhance health outcomes. 
 
These activities are all very important components of health systems and have a significant 
bearing on accountability issues. Yet, underlying all the initiatives discussed above is the 
assumption that, as service delivery is improved and as mechanisms facilitate and enable 
the state to monitor and enhance health offerings in rural areas, accountability issues are 
being addressed and resolved. However, as seen in the above discussion, the vast majority 
of mHealth programmes focus on individuals and their personal health needs. Herein lies the 
second assumption – that individuals can and will address accountability issues as 
necessary. While there is evidence that individuals will make some use of mHealth complaint 
mechanisms, this is a long way from a version of accountability that creates and supports 
enabling environments for citizens to exercise voice. 
 
Current promotions of mHealth do not provide opportunities for individuals to come together 
to engage in accountability and they do not ‘lift the barriers’ (UN 2013: xiv) or promote social 
accountability among people living in poverty or marginalised from mainstream society (cf. 
Goetz and Gaventa 2001). Existing contextual gradations in access to internet and mobile 
devices, and digital literacy – reflecting urban/rural, class, gender and other inequalities – are 
likely to be reflected in who uses and thus benefits from mHealth. Furthermore, mHealth has 
not, beyond individual complaints of poor service, supported situations in which citizens – 
and particularly disadvantaged citizens – have a collective voice in the assessment and 
articulation of health needs and in the public provision of health services (cf. Camargo 2011). 
 
Rather, most mHealth initiatives focus simultaneously on multiple activities such as: 
increasing patients’ knowledge of their conditions; offering organisational tools that help 
community health workers to better plan their daily routines and manage their patient 
populations; enhancing those workers’ health knowledge and delivery of services; facilitating 
improved links with management and enhancing supervisory support; ensuring adequate 
medical stock supplies; offering immediate reimbursement for health workers’ out-of-pocket 
expenditures; and guaranteeing regular and timely salary and incentive payments for health 
workers. All these activities have the potential to enhance service delivery if used as 
intended over the long term, yet do not create the contexts for what Fox terms ‘sandwich 
strategies’ (2015). Mobile phones and mHealth technologies do not automatically create 
coalitions of people who actively engage with the government to address low accountability 
traps. And despite their potential to deploy a wide range of service-enhancing activities, most 
do not go beyond the short and long route dichotomy to add both ‘teeth’ and ‘voice’ to 
accountability (Peixoto and Fox 2016; Fox 2015). There are, however, disease-specific 
initiatives that bring patients together in particular ways, as discussed in more detail in the 
following section. 
 
6.3 mHealth and the characteristics of health services 
As already discussed, the service characteristics approach poses questions about how 
accountability in the health sector might be shaped by overlapping and intersecting market, 
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demand and task-related characteristics and by political dynamics (Batley and Harris 2014; 
Batley and Mcloughlin 2015). Different types of health care produce different kinds of citizen-
service provider interactions and thus different accountability issues. In this section, we draw 
on Harris, Batley and Wales’ (2014) distinction between curative and preventive health care. 
Having discussed many forms of preventive mHealth examples (particularly maternal and 
child health) in relation to routes of accountability, in this section we explore mHealth 
examples from curative care (one chronic and one emergency) to assess their contribution to 
accountability. We begin with emergency care and how mHealth has been used in relation to 
the 2013–15 Ebola outbreak in West Africa before turning to mHealth for diabetes. 
 
Emergency health services are required at critical and urgent moments, and sought when 
people do not have the time to make informed or carefully rationalised decisions, and when 
emotions are paramount. They are individualised, highly irregular and do not usually bring 
people together to collectively assess their health needs and how these are being met. As 
such, they are, as Batley and Harris (2014) argue, not ideal for promoting accountability 
mechanisms. Indeed, the 2013–15 Ebola outbreak was characterised by delays in, or an 
absence of, ‘robust measures for accountability’ (Moon, Sridhar, Pate, Jha, Clinton, 
Delaunay, Edwin, et al. 2015: 2205). Mobile phones and mHealth have, however, great 
potential in relation to emergency health situations. This potential was realised in the Uganda 
Ebola outbreak of 2000 (Borchert et al. 2011) and in the 2011 Haiti earthquake (WHO 2011). 
All the countries affected by the Ebola outbreak, and their neighbours, have flailing health 
systems, inadequate health infrastructure and lack the necessary medical and human 
resources to deal with large-scale public emergencies (Amankwah-Amoah 2016; Moon et al. 
2015). During the Ebola outbreak, there were concerted efforts to use mobile phones and 
mHealth to meet collective ‘public goods’ associated with the lessening of risk of infection (cf. 
Smith 2003). 
 
Mobile phones offer two kinds of communication useful for emergency health situations, 
namely: SMS messages, which are actively produced by users; and call detail records 
(CDRs), in which information about the call (the time, the caller’s unique identifier, the cellular 
tower location, etc.) is passively recorded. This latter information produces enormous 
datasets that are owned by tele-companies. SMS messages are used to inform populations 
about emergencies and appropriate behaviour, to collect information about the emergency 
itself and for people caught up in the emergency to ask for more information (Cinnamon, 
Jones and Adger 2016; Amankwah-Amoah 2016). CDRs offer information about the location 
and movement of people who respond to emergency calls for information, surveillance or 
who are looking for information themselves. Together, these offer the potential ‘for improved 
data availability and accuracy, more rapid detection/response, and increased efficiency’ 
(Cinnamon et al. 2016: 257). 
 
All the countries affected by the Ebola outbreak (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Nigeria) and 
others at risk (Ghana) used mobile phones in one way or another to aid the response 
(Adokiya and Awoonor-Williams 2016; African Business 2015; Kangbai 2016; Kuehne et al. 
2016; Borchert et al. 2011; Cinnamon et al. 2016; Eyres, Brown and Rohan 2015). In Sierra 
Leone and Guinea, mobile phone technology was used for surveillance purposes during the 
Ebola outbreak and for contact tracing and case identification. In Moyamba district, Sierra 
Leone, community members were urged to call the District Health Management Team 
surveillance hotline and to give the names of suspected Ebola cases. Callers provided their 
details (name, phone number, and place of residence) as well as that of suspected victim(s). 
Suspected cases were then investigated by community health officers and Ebola contact 
tracers, who ensured further tests or that safe burial procedures were carried out (Kangbai 
2016; Chen et al. 2016). Sierra Leone also used an open-source SMS system, termed 
RapidPro, to monitor the availability of Ebola prevention supplies in schools and to rapidly 
replenish dwindling stocks (Cinnamon et al. 2016). 
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In Monrovia, Liberia, because it was not possible to use conventional means of data 
collection, Médecins sans Frontières used mobile phones to better understand what people 
were doing in terms of health-seeking behaviour during the Ebola epidemic, and to assess 
the death rate resulting both from Ebola and other causes (Kuehne et al. 2016). Similarly, the 
World Food Programme (WFP) developed a monthly SMS-survey applied across Sierra 
Leone, Guinea and Liberia, which enabled people to report local food shortages and prices 
resulting from the Ebola crisis (Cinnamon et al. 2016). In Nigeria, the use of mobile phones 
for surveillance and fast-tracking of potential Ebola cases was seen, by some, as the main 
reason for the country’s success in containing the disease. They allowed officials to reduce 
reporting time from 12 to 6 hours for Ebola cases and to document visits to particular 
households during the campaign (African Business 2015). 
 
CDRs – owned as they are by telecoms companies – are more difficult to access and use 
during emergencies. Companies may be reluctant to release this information, while data 
protection regulations – if indeed they are in place – may complicate such releases. While 
companies in Guinea and Sierra Leone released CDRs during the Ebola outbreak, Liberia, 
which had stricter protocols on the use of personal data, did not (Cinnamon et al. 2016). 
Although the international mobile phone association, the Groupe Speciale Mobile Association 
(GSMA), which represents the interests of the private sector, had produced privacy 
guidelines determining how CDRs might be released and used prior to the Ebola outbreak, 
these guidelines were designed for researchers’ use of big data, not for governments’ use in 
national emergencies (Eyres et al. 2015). After negotiation with relevant companies, big data 
was used during the Ebola outbreak, to help Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia determine 
where to allocate resources, to keep health professionals informed on current prevention and 
control measures, and to decide which areas might require isolation (Amankwah-Amoah 
2016). For example, in Sierra Leone, the National Ebola Response Centre (NERC) 
processed up to 700 calls per hour in peak periods. CDRs revealed the locations of these 
callers, and of the mobile response teams, and were used for the dispatching of rapid 
response teams. This also allowed for the weekly synthesising of patient call records and 
CDR data, and the presentation of maps showing how call volumes for a particular area 
increased or decreased over time. This information fed into NERCs planning, and was used 
to update district Ebola response centres, which instructed district surveillance officers to 
investigate areas of high call volume (Eyres et al. 2015). CDR information was further 
analysed after the outbreak, providing greater understanding of the kinds of people who 
made surveillance calls – an important consideration in remote, hard-to-reach places that 
rely on community members for surveillance – and enabled the visualisation of social 
networks in relation to suspected Ebola cases (Kangbai 2016). While the use of CDR proved 
useful in the Ebola response, the practice comes with potential ethical dilemmas around 
privacy, caller identification, data protection, and the degree to which callers know and 
approve of their data being used (Vayena et al. 2015). 
 
Large-scale emergency health situations underscore the need for, and challenges associated 
with, clearly defined accountability practices. These challenges affect all aspects of the 
health system and, as noted by an independent review of the global response to the Ebola 
outbreak, more work needs to be done to develop a ‘framework of norms and rules operating 
both during and between outbreaks to enable and accelerate research, govern the conduct 
of research, and ensure access to the benefits of research’ (Moon et al. 2015: 2204) – work 
that should involve governments, donors, United Nations organisations, private companies, 
the media, researchers and civil society. mHealth is of relevance here, given the public–
private partnerships that underlie it and the simultaneous potential uses of patient information 
for commercial enterprise and/or public good. This raises questions about the roles of these 
companies as the gatekeepers of information, about new information asymmetries and about 
‘the ways in which power is being orientated away from citizens and governments towards 
corporations’ (Cinnamon et al. 2016: 262). It also raises questions about how health-related 
public goods are dealt with given that, while government health information messaging aims 
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to improve population-level health, and thereby to benefit all citizens, private sector investors 
may be drawing on the same data for advertising purposes. As Vayena et al. point out, ‘the 
former aims at fostering a public good (health); the latter at generating a corporate profit’ 
(2015: 3). 
 
None of the mHealth initiatives promoted or used during the Ebola outbreak sought to 
explicitly address accountability issues, nor did initiatives seek to put members of civil society 
in touch with each other. Given the nature of the disease and its spread and the scale and 
urgency of the response, this is not surprising. However, this does not negate the need for 
accountability initiatives nor the possibilities of both inclusion and exclusion raised by using 
mHealth innovations in emergency responses. While there was considerable attention to the 
positive use of mobile communications in the Ebola outbreak, this does not guarantee 
comprehensive coverage. In Sierra Leone, for example, 30 per cent of the population did not 
own mobile phones in 2014 (Kangbai 2016). Not only do these people lose out in relation to 
health information communication, but perhaps more importantly, for accountability, ‘their 
voices will not be heard and they miss out on the ability to shape agendas and resource 
decisions’ (Cinnamon et al. 2016: 260). 
 
The characteristics and politics of chronic care, although also a form of curative health, are 
radically different from those of emergency care. Interactions between patients and between 
patients and health service providers are more regular and sustained, and the mHealth 
innovations and questions of access to information are more personalised and less 
politicised, with different and perhaps less insurmountable accountability challenges. People 
diagnosed with diabetes, for example, become increasingly familiar with their illness and the 
health system as they participate in the lifelong management of their condition to maintain 
quality of life and to avoid complications (such as loss of sight, coronary heart disease, 
stroke or kidney failure), disability and death. This management involves ‘a complex 
interaction between patients, physicians, the health care system, and society’ (Singh et al. 
2016: 68). Yet many LMICs lack the resources and infrastructure to deal with the growing 
incidence of diabetes, particularly in hard-to-reach rural areas where there are very few 
health service providers trained to deal with diabetes and its complications. In addition, many 
people with diabetes are not able to pay for treatment, and struggle to make the lifestyle 
changes required of them (reduce food intake, increase exercise, stop smoking, regularly 
self-monitor and use medication appropriately). 
 
mHealth offers ‘a new delivery system’ for people with diabetes, which includes remote 
training of health-care service providers, improved technology and information dissemination 
for patient self-management, regular medical reminders to ensure that medication is taken at 
appropriate times, better monitoring of patient records and information processing, upgraded 
patient–provider communications and, as a consequence, improved health service delivery 
(Patnaik, Joshi and Sahu 2015; Singh et al. 2016). For example, in India and Pakistan, the 
CARRS Trial used electronic health records (EHRs) (which collated and personalised data, 
sent out prompts and reminders, scheduled appointments, etc.) and decision-support 
software, coupling patients with non-physician staff who offered monitoring and support, and 
who reviewed patients’ EHRs and used algorithms to make treatment prompts to physicians 
(Shah et al. 2012). Similarly, in India and Tanzania, the Step-By-Step programme trained 
nurses and doctors to recognise lower limb complications and provided an algorithm for the 
management of patients’ feet (Singh et al. 2016). In Brazil, diabetes patients received weekly 
IVR calls that offered support and monitored their progress (Piette et al. 2014). In Honduras 
and Mexico, diabetes patients also received automated support calls that provided an 
opportunity to discuss their condition and self-care problems while also alerting clinicians and 
care-givers (both formal and informal) of the patients’ progress and offering suggestions for 
further support (Singh et al. 2016). In Iran, Bangladesh and Iraq, SMS messages were used 
to enhance diabetic patients’ knowledge of their condition and, in Bangladesh and Iran, to 
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help them maintain normal glucose levels (Goodarzi et al. 2012; Haddad et al. 2014; Shariful 
Islam et al. 2015). 
 
Harris and colleagues (2014) argued, in assessing the characteristics of health services, that 
the conditions associated with longer-term chronic care might facilitate accountability. This 
idea was based on the creation of advocacy and patient support groups that promote both 
improved medical knowledge (reducing information asymmetry) and networking, thereby 
potentially creating spaces for collective action and citizen voice (Harris et al. 2014).  
mHealth diabetes programmes in LMICs have used EMRs or tracking procedures to promote 
‘standardized guidelines and treatment algorithms’ and to augment health service delivery by 
‘informing health care professionals what is expected of them and ensuring more 
reproducible care of patients by different health care workers’ (Singh et al. 2016). Digital 
technologies have improved knowledge about diabetes both among patients and health-care 
staff, have created better access to health information and services for patients, and have 
provided new mechanisms to increase support either from health system representatives or 
from community members. These activities all indirectly address accountability issues in 
relation to the characteristics of chronic care. First, the enhanced focus on service delivery is 
important and significant, given the resource-constrained contexts in which diabetes is 
tackled in LMICs. mHealth diabetes interventions make it easier for patients and health 
system staff to manage and monitor the illness, promote greater standardisation of treatment 
and relieve some of the burden on community health workers and others. Second, diabetes 
programmes go some way towards addressing information asymmetries as there is evidence 
that mHealth technologies have enhanced patients’ knowledge of their condition. 
 
What mHealth initiatives in diabetes have not done, however, is build networks or spaces for 
collective voice and action. Almost all mHealth initiatives have focused on individual diabetics 
and their personalised interactions with the health system. One exception is in South Africa, 
where women with diabetes were brought together for weekly sessions in which they shared 
a meal and received information on diet, physical exercise, management of diabetes, 
problem-solving, managing emotional upheaval, and coping strategies. Mobile phones were 
also used to link these women in a peer support system and to question them about their 
daily behaviour (Rotheram-Borus et al. 2012). However, underlying these examples are 
assumptions similar to those discussed in relation to long- and short-route accountability. 
These are, first, that accountability is primarily needed to address service delivery 
inadequacies and that improvements in delivery therefore resolve accountability challenges; 
and second, that a focus on individuals is useful for accountability and can bring about 
positive social change. 
 
Yet, addressing diabetes involves moving beyond individual patients and health systems and 
addressing a range of things such as the local environments in which people live, the 
availability of health foodstuffs, widespread knowledge of and support for diabetes, and 
appropriate policies to minimise risk factors. This requires multidisciplinary and multi-sector 
collaborations that include communities, local governments, NGOs, the private sector, the 
food industry, physicians and other health professionals, national steering committees to 
adapt and promote international guidelines, local diabetes care groups, community health 
workers, peer educators, advisory panels, and more (Singh et al. 2016). All these 
relationships and factors are embraced within a broader accountability lens. Bringing 
together diabetes patients to discuss these wider issues, in relation to questions about self-
management and health system access, creates the possibility of collective actions to 
improve accountability. 
 
One mHealth diabetes initiative, MoPoTsyo in Cambodia, has explicitly sought to create 
collective spaces and to address health system constraints. MoPoTsyo included many of the 
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above-listed aims – including a focus on patients’ self-management of diabetes8 – but went 
far beyond this to tackle political issues such as the lack of affordable medicines, access to a 
broader range of health-care services, and to influence national policy processes. It offered 
people diagnosed with diabetes the opportunity to become peer educators, which involved 
successfully completing a six-week training programme in Khmer, being tested on their 
knowledge and skills, being equipped with handheld devices to measure glucose levels, 
being linked into a network of peer educators, and the obligation to form new patient groups 
in their respective communities. MoPoTsyo also challenged pharmacists on the provision of 
drugs, fought for the provision of generic medicines at fixed prices, and even sourced bulk 
medical supplies on the international market to be distributed by pharmacists (with a profit-
sharing agreement). It also developed its own laboratory facilities in response to the lack of 
government facilities and has worked with the Minister of Health to expand its peer education 
model into the National Strategic Plan for Prevention and Control of Non-Communicable 
Diseases (NCDs) 2013–20 (van Olmen et al. 2016). Mobile devices were used in this 
initiative, but much of the activity around building and demanding accountability and 
improved care occurred offline. Technology – while enabling patient care and peer 
communication – cannot be credited alone. Rather, deliberate decisions were made to 
embed more politicised objectives into the institutional design of the programme, which by 
virtue of the nature of diabetes as a chronic condition, lent itself more readily to sustained 
engagement by patients in a collective manner. 
 
 
7 Politics and power in mHealth 
accountability 
This report has highlighted the accountability challenges in health systems in LMICs from two 
distinct perspectives and has sought to situate mHealth innovations within these debates. 
The broader institutional environment, including the nature of the state and its formal and 
informal rules and practices, shapes the incentives and constraints of public officials, service 
providers and citizens to supply and demand accountability. These incentives and 
constraints are further mediated by the characteristics and nature of different forms and 
aspects of health care, their particular political dynamics, and thus specific accountability 
challenges. Taken together, the approaches suggest that institutional incentives must be 
carefully calibrated to support the necessary components for accountability between 
principals and agents (mandates, resources, information, monitoring and enforceability) while 
considering the distinct political challenges presented by health services. And while it may 
appear fairly straightforward to accomplish this – tweaking the rules or designing initiatives to 
activate existing mechanisms – efforts to increase accountability occur in dynamic political 
contexts in which powerful interests have stakes in maintaining the status quo. Any such 
attempts to shift the balance of power are frequently contested and difficult to implement. 
 
Pressure for change might come from within the state (or perhaps from international bodies 
or donors) on the ‘supply side’, from citizens and civil society on the ‘demand side’, or a 
combination of actors, and occur along short, long or more holistic hybrid routes. Citizen 
participation in social accountability processes – often supported by donors, NGOs or other 
development actors – is particularly important for the most marginalised groups in society 
who are too often failed by traditional democratic and bureaucratic institutions (Joshi and 
Houtzager 2012). However, citizen voice operates best in the context of enabling 
environments, democratic structures and transparent information made readily available to 
citizens. But even in these ideal conditions, there remain challenges to reaching out to more 
                                                          
8  For instance, peer educators host weekly gatherings in their homes which, in effect, become patient information centres. 
Here, community members can get tested for diabetes, learn about the illness and have their conditions monitored. 
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marginalised groups and ensuring accountability of health services for people living in 
poverty. And, as discussed earlier, citizen voice for demanding better health services is 
constrained by a wide range of factors, including geographical location and remoteness, 
infrequency of use of particular health services, variability of citizens’ care needs, information 
asymmetry, socioeconomic resources, gender and other social hierarchies and – perhaps 
the most critical in terms of accountability – the fact that most health services are used 
privately and not collectively. 
 
Taking all these factors into consideration, improving accountability for better health services 
becomes a very complex task and invites questions as to what effective efforts might actually 
look like and what their goals should be. Scholars have warned of the limitations of thinking 
about accountability initiatives simply as technical interventions or ‘widgets’ through which 
particular inputs lead to particular outputs and act as ends in themselves (Joshi and 
Houtzager 2012). This obscures the complex political and social contexts in which 
accountability initiatives unfold and the power relations through which they are mediated and 
which they ultimately seek to change. Moreover, such thinking does not invite consideration 
of broader long-term objectives or the potential to situate individual mechanisms within multi-
stranded collective strategies that seek to deepen democracy, empower citizens and 
advance developmental goals (McGee and Gaventa 2011). Thus, the extent to which 
accountability initiatives, including those in the mHealth category, have real ‘impact’ depends 
not only on whether and how individual mechanisms work to achieve their technical 
objectives (e.g. collecting user feedback on a particular health service experience) but also 
on whether and how they advance challenges to inequitable power relations and reconfigure 
politics to the advantage of the marginalised groups. 
 
In the context of mHealth and in light of the dearth of research focusing on how mHealth can 
facilitate accountability, it is vital to give greater consideration to power and politics. There is 
little evidence that mHealth initiatives are currently addressing the adverse incentives felt by 
politicians to support only the visible/attributable aspects of health care, or those which meet 
the needs of elites. Indeed, mHealth might even create opportunities for state actors to 
‘perform accountability’ in ways that oversimplify complex issues and allow them to overlook 
politically inconvenient or unpalatable issues. Yet, might mHealth initiatives in the future be 
able to address these issues? 
 
mHealth is an innovative and powerful tool that can enhance the reach of government 
communications; the positive benefits of SMS messaging, for instance, have been repeatedly 
shown. But might a reliance on mHealth create new categories of marginalisation that have 
negative ramifications for health service delivery and accountability? Furthermore, while 
mHealth gives patients more information about their conditions, only in isolated instances is it 
being used to challenge the distribution of health service provision or existing patterns of 
exclusion and inequality? Does this mean that mHealth initiatives are primarily reinforcing 
existing power relations, and are they ‘normalised and bureaucratised’ in ways that 
undermine their potential to bring about social change (Cornwall and Brock 2005: 1050)? Or 
is it possible that mHealth might be shifting power away from citizens and governments 
towards private sector companies and thus structurally undermining the space for citizens to 
engage in accountability initiatives? And while mHealth has promoted ICT-enabled citizen 
voice platforms for health issues – mostly in the form of channels through which citizens can 
report on the quality of service – there is little evidence that these automatically generate 
spaces for citizen voice to take on issues requiring greater accountability. There is also little 
consideration of how digital technology and mHealth might affect, and be affected by, 
politics. 
 
While there has been much speculation on the potential of mHealth, less consideration has 
been given to its limitations. Kumar and colleagues point out, for instance, that a review of 47 
publications on the use of EMRs in low-resource settings showed that ‘political, ethical or 
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financial considerations were rarely reported’ (Kumar, Paton and Kirigia 2016: 975). This 
review suggests that we should also think about the limits of mHealth, particularly in relation 
to accountability. First, the defining feature of mHealth initiatives is the centrality of the 
mobile phone. The technological nature and the potential it brings should not be taken for 
granted, and questions around power and access must be acknowledged: specifically, who 
has access to mobile phones and what might this access entail? Who collates the data 
provided through mobile phones and who uses these data to think about community or 
population-level rather than individualised health problems? Who has access to collated data 
and who has the space to question whether these data are used in appropriate ways? 
Second, although not alone in this limitation, what scope does mHealth (often undertaken in 
partnership between government and the private sector) have for bringing to the table health 
issues that are politically and socially unpalatable? Issues such as sexual health services 
and advice for minors or sexually marginalised communities and issues of illicit drug use may 
be sufficiently socially and politically taboo that they remain squarely off the agenda. Those 
in need of services related to these issues may have little recourse, and mHealth initiatives, 
as subject to the politics and power dynamics of the contexts in which they operate, may be 
no better placed to improve access to such services or accountability for these people. 
Alternatively, social enterprise or market-driven initiatives may offer mobile-accessed internet 
mHealth platforms that provide information, but which are unsupported by governments and 
are not linked to any in-country service delivery. 
 
 
8 Conclusion 
This paper has laid the analytical foundations for understanding how mHealth innovations 
have begun to, and will continue to, reshape health systems through an accountability lens. 
By taking an institutional approach to accountability, and emphasising the five elements of 
mandates, resources, information, monitoring and enforcement, we have shown that 
mHealth has the most potential for impact in the long route to accountability through its 
innovative provision of information. Radically improving the flow of health-related and service 
use-related data from citizens to the upper layers of government dramatically increases 
decision-makers’ capacity to design better policy, allocate resources more effectively 
(including paying health workers more efficiently) and monitor service providers. Whether or 
not this translates into effective gains for health-related accountability depends, however, on 
the wider political environment, and on how actors in government and service provision are 
incentivised or discouraged from acting in the best interests of the population. In short, 
mHealth technologies cannot automatically and independently address accountability issues; 
proponents must take into account political and social arrangements, and aim to design 
mHealth initiatives to complement or bolster ‘offline’ interventions such as formal sanctions 
already embedded in government structures. 
 
In the short route to accountability, mHealth holds promise for connecting citizens to 
alternative health services through new markets, and while market competition may 
incentivise government providers to improve, it may also mean that poor people are subject 
to new forms of exploitation and low-quality care. Furthermore, growing access to health 
markets may also leave public services languishing in low accountability traps. mHealth has, 
to date, shown less potential in relating to the other dimension of the short accountability 
route – namely citizen voice, and the engagement of citizens directly with service providers 
on a local level. Although some mHealth apps have features allowing citizens to give 
feedback on their experiences of services on an individual basis, this does not encourage 
collective action unless this feedback is aggregated, made publicly available and actively 
monitored by citizens and civil society who then choose to act on it. Positive change and 
responsiveness on the part of providers or public officials on the basis of this feedback is 
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also predicated on whether they are incentivised to act upon it by the institutional architecture 
of the health system and character of the state. 
 
mHealth does demonstrate tremendous potential for increasing the capacity of health service 
providers to do their jobs by helping them reach more patients, offer better care, and provide 
resources and tools to assist in diagnosis, treatment, patient health monitoring and 
communication. From an accountability perspective, these types of mHealth apps can be 
thought of as resources that greatly enhance the capacity of health workers to carry out their 
mandates at the level of implementation. mHealth also holds promise for helping patients 
overcome some of the information asymmetry inherent in health care, and to know more 
about their conditions and what constitutes appropriate treatment and quality care. This is 
especially the case for patients with chronic conditions, such as diabetes, who are repeatedly 
in contact with health services. Apps can help these patients improve their self-care through 
information provision and medication reminders, but also enhance their interaction with 
health services through patient monitoring, appointment reminders and communication. 
Some apps also include features through which patients can interact with and support each 
other, which may have more scope for potential collective actions for accountability. 
 
In contrast, emergency and preventive public health care lend themselves less to 
accountability although for different reasons. Desperation in emergency situations, whether 
individual or communal, urgently requires accountability but does not allow for patients to 
come together and reflect on the characteristics of the health system and their experience of 
health care. In cases of epidemics or natural disasters, mHealth is most useful in its ability to 
facilitate better response by governments and providers through quick information transfer – 
only one (albeit crucial) element of accountability. More work needs to be done on whether 
mHealth can facilitate accountability for more individualised patient emergencies. More 
empirical and conceptual work also needs to be done on whether and how mHealth can 
challenge inequitable distribution in health systems and raise questions of governance of 
health services, thereby addressing accountability failures. Finally, it is necessary to 
interrogate mHealth technologies in greater depth – to look at the political economy of the 
algorithms, the coding of the platforms, the processes of harvesting data, long-term 
consequences and the ‘solutions’ being proposed – to critically assess what kinds of 
behaviours are being promoted, whose health needs are being included, and whose are 
being excluded and thus rendered invisible in relation to LMICs’ health systems. 
 
  
37 
 
References 
Adokiya, M.N. and Awoonor-Williams, J.K. (2016) ‘Ebola Virus Disease Surveillance and 
Response Preparedness in Northern Ghana’, Global Health Action 9.0: 29763. 
doi:10.3402/gha.v9.29763 
 
African Business (2015) ‘After Ebola’, August/September 2015 
 
Agarwal, S. and Labrique, A. (2014) ‘Newborn Health on the Line: The Potential mHealth 
Applications’, JAMA 312.3: 229–30 
 
Agarwal, S.; Heltberg, R. and Diachok, M. (2009) Scaling-up Social Accountability in World 
Bank Operations, Washington DC: World Bank, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/423211468164948681/Scaling-up-social-
accountability-in-World-Bank-operations (accessed 12 May 2017) 
 
Ahmed, T.; Bloom, G.; Iqbal, M.; Lucas, H.; Rasheed, S.; Waldman, L.; Khan, A.S.; Islam, R. 
and Bhuiya, A. (2014) E-Health and M-Health in Bangladesh: Opportunities and 
Challenges, IDS Evidence Report 60, Brighton: IDS, 
http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/3613 (accessed 15 May 2017) 
 
Akpanuko, E. and Asogwa, I. (2013) ‘Accountability: A Synthesis’, International Journal of 
Finance and Accounting 2.3: 164–73 
 
Akter, S.; Ray, P. and D’Ambra, J. (2013) ‘Continuance of mHealth Services at the Bottom of 
the Pyramid: The Roles of Service Quality and Trust’, Electronic Markets 23.1: 29–47. 
doi:10.1007/s12525-012-0091-5 
 
Amankwah-Amoah, J. (2016) ‘Emerging Economies, Emerging Challenges: Mobilising and 
Capturing Value from Big Data’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change 110 
(September): 167–74. doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2015.10.022 
 
Bagayoko, C.O.; Traoré, D.; Thevoz, L.; Diabaté, S.; Pecoul, D.; Niang, M.; Bediang, G.; 
Traoré, S.T.; Anne, A. and Geissbuhler, A. (2014) ‘Medical and Economic Benefits of 
Telehealth in Low-and Middle-Income Countries: Results of a Study in Four District 
Hospitals in Mali’, BMC Health Services Research 14.1: S9 
 
Batavia, H. and Kaonga, N. (2014) mHealth Support Tools for Improving the Performance of 
Frontline Health Workers: An Inventory and Analytical Review, Washington DC: 
mHealth Alliance 
 
Batchelor, S.; Waldman, L.; Bloom, G.; Rasheed, S.; Scott, N.; Ahmed, T.; Khan, N. and 
Sharmin, T. (2015) ‘Understanding Health Information Seeking from an Actor-Centric 
Perspective’, International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 12.7: 
8103–24. doi:10.3390/ijerph120708103 
 
Bateman, C. (2014) ‘Using Basic Technology – and Corporate Social Responsibility – to 
Save Lives’, SAMJ: South African Medical Journal 104.12: 839–40 
 
Batley, R. and Harris, D. (2014) Analysing the Politics of Public Services: A Service 
Characteristics Approach, London: Overseas Development Institute and University of 
Birmingham, www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-
files/8913.pdf (accessed 3 July 2017) 
 
38 
 
Batley, R. and McLoughlin, C. (2015) ‘The Politics of Public Services: A Service 
Characteristics Approach’, World Development 74: 275–85 
 
Bediang, G.; Perrin, C.; de Castañeda, R.R.; Kamga, Y.; Sawadogo, A.; Bagayoko, C.O. and 
Geissbuhler, A. (2015) ‘The RAFT Telemedicine Network: Lessons Learnt and 
Perspectives from a Decade of Educational and Clinical Services in Low- and Middle-
Incomes Countries’, in R. Wootton and L. Bonnardot (eds), Telemedicine in Low-
Resource Settings, Frontiers in Public Health, Frontiers Media SA 
 
Berlan, D. and Shiffman, J. (2012) ‘Holding Health Providers in Developing Countries 
Accountable to Consumers: A Synthesis of Relevant Scholarship’, Health Policy and 
Planning 27.4: 271–80 
 
Björkman, M. and Svensson, J. (2009) ‘Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized 
Field Experiment on Community-based Monitoring in Uganda’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 124.2: 735–69 
 
Bloom, G.; Standing, H. and Lloyd, R. (2008) ‘Markets, Information Asymmetry and Health 
Care: Towards New Social Contracts’, Social Science & Medicine 66.10: 2076–87. 
doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2008.01.034 
 
Bloom, G.; Kanjilal, B.; Lucas, H.; Peters, D.H. and Standing, H. (2012) ‘Introduction’, in      
G. Bloom, B. Kanjilal, H. Lucas and D.H. Peters (eds), Transforming Health Markets in 
Asia and Africa, London: Routledge 
 
Borchert, M.; Mutyaba, I.; Van Kerkhove, M.D.; Lutwama, J.; Luwaga, H.; Bisoborwa, G.; 
Turyagaruka, J.; Pirard, P.; Ndayimirije, N.; Roddy, P. and Van Der Stuyft, P. (2011) 
‘Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever Outbreak in Masindi District, Uganda: Outbreak 
Description and Lessons Learned’, BMC Infectious Diseases 11.1: 357 
 
Borkum, E.; Rotz, D. and Rangarajan, A. (2015) ‘A Mobile Tool for Health Workers: 
Promising Results in Bihar, India’, Mathematica Issue Brief, www.mathematica-
mpr.com/-/media/publications/pdfs/international/itc_ccs_bihar_ib.pdf (accessed 15 May 
2017) 
 
Brinkerhoff, D.W. (2004) ‘Accountability and Health Systems: Toward Conceptual Clarity and 
Policy Relevance’, Health Policy and Planning 19.6: 371–9. doi:10.1093/heapol/czh052 
 
Camargo, C.B (2011) Accountability for Better Healthcare Provision: A Framework and 
Guidelines to Define, Understand and Assess Accountability in Health Systems, Basel 
Institution on Governance Working Paper 10, Basel: Basel Institution on Governance 
 
Camargo, C.B. and Jacobs, E. (2011) Social Accountability and its Conceptual Challenges: 
An Analytical Framework, Basel Institution on Governance Working Paper 16, Basel 
Institute on Governance, www.baselgovernance.org/sites/collective.localhost/files/ 
publications/biog_working_paper_16.pdf (accessed 3 July 2017) 
 
Castro-Leal, F.; Dayton, J.; Demery, D. and Mehra, K. (2000) ‘Public Spending on Health 
Care in Africa: Do the Poor Benefit?’, Bulletin of the World Health Organization 78.1:  
66 –74 
 
Chamberlain, S. (2014) ‘A Mobile Guide Toward Better Health: How Mobile Kunji is 
Improving Birth Outcomes in Bihar, India (Innovations Case Narrative: Mobile Kunji 
(Mobile Guide))’, Innovations 9.3–4: 43–52 
 
39 
 
Chen, Y.; Shu, L.; Crespi, N.; Lee, G.M. and Guizani, M. (2016) ‘Understanding the Impact of 
Network Structure on Propagation Dynamics Based on Mobile Big Data’, in Wireless 
Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC), 2016 International, 
1018–23, IEEE, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/7577198/ (accessed        
3 July 2017) 
 
Cinnamon, J.; Jones, S.K. and Adger, W.N. (2016) ‘Evidence and Future Potential of Mobile 
Phone Data for Disease Disaster Management’, Geoforum 75 (October): 253–64 
 
Coelho, V.S. (2006) ‘Brazilian Health Councils: Including the Excluded?’, in A. Cornwall and 
V.S. Coelho (eds), Spaces for Change? The Politics of Citizen Participation in New 
Democratic Arenas, London: Zed Books 
 
Cornwall, A. and Brock, K. (2005) ‘What Do Buzzwords Do for Development Policy? A 
Critical Look at “Participation”, “Empowerment” and “Poverty Reduction”’, Third World 
Quarterly 26.7: 1043–60 
 
Cornwall, A. and Shankland, A. (2013) ‘Cultures of Politics, Spaces of Power: 
Contextualizing Brazilian Experiences of Participation’, Journal of Political Power 6.2: 
309-33, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/2158379X.2013.811859 (accessed 3 July 2017) 
 
Couldry, N. (2010) Why Voice Matters: Culture and Politics after Neoliberalism, London: 
Sage Publications 
 
Cummins, M. and Huddleston, B. (2013) ‘Real Time Monitoring for the Most Vulnerable: 
UNICEF’s Experience in Uganda’, IDS Bulletin 44.2: 57–68, 
http://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/idsbo/article/view/247 (accessed 3 July 2017) 
 
Detmer, D.; Singleton, P.; MacLeod, A.; Wait, S.; Taylor, M. and Ridgwell, J. (2003) The 
Informed Patient, Cambridge: Cambridge University Health 
 
Devarajan, S.; Khemani, S. and Walton, M. (2014) ‘Can Civil Society Overcome Government 
Failure in Africa?’, World Bank Research Observer 29.1: 20–47 
 
Diedhiou, A.; Gilroy, K.E.; Cox, C.M.; Duncan, L.; Koumtingue, D.; Pacqué-Margolis, S.; Fort, 
A.; Settle, D. and Bailey, R. (2015) ‘Successful mLearning Pilot in Senegal: Delivering 
Family Planning Refresher Training Using Interactive Voice Response and SMS’, 
Global Health: Science and Practice 3.2: 305–21 
 
Do Rosário Costa, N. and Vaitsman, J. (2014) ‘Universalization and Privatization: How Policy 
Analysis Can Help Understand the Development of Brazil’s Health System’, Journal of 
Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 16.5: 441–56 
 
Edwards, M. and Hulme, D. (1996) ‘NGO Performance and Accountability: Introduction and 
Overview’, in M. Edwards and D. Hulme (eds), Non-Governmental Organisations – 
Performance and Accountability: Beyond the Magic Bullet, London: Earthscan 
Publications 
 
Eldon, J.; Waddington, C. and Hadi, Y. (2008) ‘Health Systems Reconstruction and State-
Building’, Health & Fragile States Network 58 
 
Eyres, P.J.; Brown, L. and Rohan, H. (2015) ‘Deployment of Caller Location Services within 
Sierra Leone’s 117 Ebola Response Centre’, Procedia Engineering 107: 372–76 
 
40 
 
Fox, J.A. (2015) ‘Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say?’, World 
Development 72 (August): 346–61 
 
Fox, J. (2007) ‘The Uncertain Relationship between Transparency and Accountability’, 
Development in Practice 17.4: 663–71 
 
Franz-Vasdeki, J.; Pratt, B.A.; Newsome, M. and Germann, S. (2015) ‘Taking mHealth 
Solutions to Scale: Enabling Environments and Successful Implementation’, Journal of 
Mobile Technology in Medicine 4.1: 35–8 
 
Gauthier, B. and Wane, W. (2009) ‘Leakage of Public Resources in the Health Sector: An 
Empirical Investigation of Chad’, Journal of African Economies 18.1: 52–83 
 
Goetz, A.M. and Gaventa, J. (2001) Bringing Citizen Voice and Client Focus into Service 
Delivery, IDS Working Paper 138, Brighton: IDS 
 
Goetz, A.M. and Jenkins, R. (2005) Reinventing Accountability: Making Democracy Work for 
Human Development, London: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Goetz, A.M. and Jenkins, R. (2001) ‘Hybrid Forms of Accountability: Citizen Engagement in 
Institutions of Public Sector Oversight in India’, Public Management Review 3.3:     
363–83 
 
Goodarzi, M.; Ebrahimzadeh, I.; Rabi, A.; Saedipoor, B. and Jafarabadi, M.A. (2012) ‘Impact 
of Distance Education via Mobile Phone Text Messaging on Knowledge, Attitude, 
Practice and Self Efficacy of Patients with Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus in Iran’, Journal of 
Diabetes & Metabolic Disorders 11.1: 1 
 
Gorman, G.E. (2015) ‘What’s Missing in the Digital World? Access, Digital Literacy and 
Digital Citizenship’, Online Information Review 39.2 
 
Haddad, N.S.; Istepanian, R.; Philip, N.; Khazaal, F.A.K.; Hamdan, T.A.; Pickles, T.; Amso, 
N. and Gregory, J.W. (2014) ‘A Feasibility Study of Mobile Phone Text Messaging to 
Support Education and Management of Type 2 Diabetes in Iraq’, Diabetes Technology 
& Therapeutics 16.7: 454–9 
 
Hall, C.S.; Fottrell, E.; Wilkinson, S. and Byass, P. (2014) ‘Assessing the Impact of mHealth 
Interventions in Low- and Middle-Income Countries – What Has Been Shown to 
Work?’, Global Health Action 7.0 
 
Hampshire, K.; Porter, G.; Owusu, S.A.; Mariwah, S.; Abane, A.; Robson, E.; Munthali, A.; 
DeLannoy, A.; Bango, A.; Gunguluzaf, N. and Milnere, J. (2015) ‘Informal M-Health: 
How Are Young People Using Mobile Phones to Bridge Healthcare Gaps in Sub-
Saharan Africa?’, Social Science & Medicine 142: 90–9 
 
Hampshire, K.R.; Porter, G.; Owusu, S.A.; Tanle, A. and Abane, A. (2011) ‘Out of the Reach 
of Children? Young People’s Health-Seeking Practices and Agency in Africa’s Newly-
Emerging Therapeutic Landscapes’, Social Science & Medicine 73.5: 702–10 
 
Harris, D.; Batley, R. and Wales, J. (2014) The Technical is Political: What Does this Mean in 
the Health Sector?, London: Overseas Development Institute and University of 
Birmingham, www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-
files/8888.pdf (accessed 3 July 2017) 
 
41 
 
Harris, D.; Wales, J.; Jones, H.; Rana, T. and Chitrakar, R.L. (2014) Human Resources for 
Health in Nepal: The Politics of Access in Remote Areas, London: Overseas 
Development Institute 
 
He, D.; Naveed, N.; Gunter, C.A. and Nahrstedt, K. (2014) ‘Security Concerns in Android 
mHealth Apps’, AMIA Annual Symposium, November, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/ 
viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.646.6510&rep=rep1&type=pdf (accessed 16 May 2017) 
 
Iwaya, L.H.; Gomes, M.A.L.; Simplício, M.A.; Carvalho, T.C.; Dominicini, C.K.; Sakuragui, 
R.R.; Rebelo, M.S.; Gutierrez, M.A.; Näslund, M. and Håkansson, P. (2013) ‘Mobile 
Health in Emerging Countries: A Survey of Research Initiatives in Brazil’, International 
Journal of Medical Informatics 82.5: 283–98 
 
Joshi, A. (2013) ‘Do they Work? Assessing the Impact of Transparency and Accountability 
Initiatives in Service Delivery’, Development Policy Review 31: s1 
 
Joshi, A. and Houtzager, P. (2012) ‘Widgets or Watchdogs?: Conceptual Explorations in 
Social Accountability’, Public Management Review 14.2: 145–62 
 
Kangbai, J.B. (2016) ‘Social Network Analysis and Modeling of Cellphone-Based Syndromic 
Surveillance Data for Ebola in Sierra Leone’, Asian Pacific Journal of Tropical Medicine 
9.9: 851–5 
 
Kolstad, I. and Wiig, A. (2009) ‘Is Transparency the Key to Reducing Corruption in Resource-
Rich Countries?’, World Development 37.3: 521–32 
 
Kuehne, A.; Lynch, E.; Marshall, E.; Tiffany, A.; Alley, I.; Bawo, L.; Massaquoi, M.; Lodesani, 
C.; Le Vaillant, P.; Porten, K. and Gignoux, E. (2016) ‘Mortality, Morbidity and Health-
Seeking Behaviour during the Ebola Epidemic 2014–2015 in Monrovia Results from a 
Mobile Phone Survey’, PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases 10.8 
 
Kumar, P.; Paton, C. and Kirigia, D. (2016) ‘I’ve Got 99 Problems but a Phone Ain’t One: 
Electronic and Mobile Health in Low and Middle Income Countries’, Archives of 
Disease in Childhood 101.10: 974–9 
 
Labrique, A.B.; Pereira, S.; Christian, C.; Murthy, N.; Bartlett, L. and Mehl, G. (2012) 
‘Pregnancy Registration Systems Can Enhance Health Systems, Increase 
Accountability and Reduce Mortality’, Reproductive Health Matters 20.39: 113–17 
 
Labrique, A.B.; Vasudevan, L.; Kochi, E.; Fabricant, R. and Mehl, G. (2013) ‘mHealth 
Innovations as Health System Strengthening Tools: 12 Common Applications and a 
Visual Framework’, Global Health: Science and Practice 1.2: 160–71 
 
Lodenstein, E.; Dieleman, M.; Gerretsen, B. and Broerse, J.E. (2016) ‘Health Provider 
Responsiveness to Social Accountability Initiatives in Low- and Middle-Income 
Countries: A Realist Review’, Health Policy and Planning 32.1: 125–40 
 
Loewenson, R. (2008) ‘Neglected Health Systems Research: Governance and 
Accountability’, Research Issues 3: 2–11 
 
Lucas, H. (2015) ‘New Technology and Illness Self-Management: Potential Relevance for 
Resource-Poor Populations in Asia’, Social Science & Medicine 145: 145–53 
 
 
42 
 
Lucas, H. (2012) ‘A Review of ICT Innovations by Private-Sector Providers in Developing 
Countries’, in G. Bloom, B. Kanjilal, H. Lucas and D.H. Peters (eds), Transforming 
Health Markets in Asia and Africa: Improving Quality and Access for the Poor, London: 
Routledge 
 
Madon, S.; Krishna, S. and Michael, E. (2010) ‘Health Information Systems, Decentralisation 
and Democratic Accountability’, Public Administration and Development 30.4: 247–60 
 
Mahmud, S. (2007) ‘Spaces for Participation in Health Systems in Rural Bangladesh: The 
Experience of Stakeholder Community Groups’, in A. Cornwall and V.S. Coelho (eds), 
Spaces for Change? The Politics of Citizen Participation in New Democratic Arenas, 
London: Zed Books 
 
Malena, C. with Forster, R. and Singh, J. (2004) Social Accountability: An Introduction to the 
Concept and Emerging Practice, Social Development Papers, Participation and Civic 
Engagement Paper 76, Washington DC: World Bank 
 
Mangone, E.R.; Agarwal, S.; L’Engle, K.; Lasway, C.; Zan, T.; van Beijma, H.; Orkis, J. and 
Karam, R. (2016) ‘Sustainable Cost Models for mHealth at Scale: Modeling Program 
Data from m4RH Tanzania’, PloS ONE 11.1: e0148011 
 
McGee, R. and Gaventa, J. (2011) Shifting Power? Assessing the Impact of Transparency 
and Accountability Initiatives, IDS Working Paper 383, Brighton: IDS, 
www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Wp383.pdf (accessed 16 May 2017) 
 
McNeil, M. and Mumvuma, T. (2006) Demanding Good Governance: A Stocktaking of Social 
Accountability Initiatives by Civil Society in Anglophone Africa, World Bank Institute 
Working Paper 261, Washington DC: World Bank 
 
Mechael, P.; Batavia, H.; Kaonga, N.; Searle, S.; Kwan, A.; Goldberger, A.; Fu, L. and 
Ossman, J. (2010) Barriers and Gaps Affecting mHealth in Low and Middle Income 
Countries: A Policy White Paper, Washington DC: mHealth Alliance/Columbia 
University, Earth Institute, Center for Global Health and Economic Development 
(CGHED), http://cgsd.columbia.edu/files/2012/11/mHealthBarriersWhitePaper 
FINAL.pdf  (accessed 15 May 2017) 
 
Mehl, G. and Labrique, A. (2014) ‘Prioritizing Integrated mHealth Strategies for Universal 
Health Coverage’, Science 345.6202: 1284–7 
 
Moon, S.; Sridhar, D.; Pate, M.A.; Jha, A.K.; Clinton, C.; Delaunay, S.; Edwin, V.; Fallah, M.; 
Fidler, D.P.; Garrett, L.; Goosby, E.; Gostin, L.O.; Heymann, D.L.; Lee, K.; Leung, 
G.M.; Morrison, J.S.; Saavedra, J.; Tanner, M.; Leigh, J.A.; Hawkins, B.; Woskie, 
L.R. and Piot, P. (2015) ‘Will Ebola Change the Game? Ten Essential Reforms Before 
the Next Pandemic. The Report of the Harvard-LSHTM Independent Panel on the 
Global Response to Ebola’, The Lancet 386.10009: 2204–21 
 
Moore, M. and Teskey, G. (2006) ‘The CAR Framework: Capability, Accountability, 
Responsiveness: What Do These Terms Mean, Individually and Collectively? A 
Discussion Note for DFID Governance and Conflict Advisers’, DFID Governance 
Retreat, 14–17 November 
 
Mosse, D. (2004) ‘Is Good Policy Unimplementable? Reflections on the Ethnography of Aid 
Policy and Practice’, Development and Change 35.4: 639–71 
 
43 
 
Motsoaledi, A. (2015a) ‘Launch of Adolescent Mobisite and Anniversary of Momconnect’, 
Speech by the South African Minister of Health, Kt Motubatse Community Centre, 
Soshanguve, 20 August 2015, www.gov.za/speeches/minister-aaron-motsoaledi-
launch-adolescent-mobisite-and-anniversary-momconnect-20-aug-2015 (accessed    
16 May 2017) 
 
Motsoaledi, A. (2015b) ‘Minister Aaron Motsoaledi: Health Dept Budget Vote 2015/16’,          
5 May, www.gov.za/speeches/minister-aaron-motsoaledi-health-dept-budget-vote-
201516-5-may-2015-0000 (accessed 16 May 2017) 
 
Murakami, A.; Gutierrez, M.; Large, S.; Rebelo, M.; Guiraldelli, R. and Ramires, J. (2006)    
‘A Continuous Glucose Monitoring System in Critical Cardiac Patients in the Intensive 
Care Unit’, Computers in Cardiology Conference, 7–12 September, 233–6 
 
Muula, A.S. and Maseko, F.C. (2006) ‘How are Health Professionals Earning their Living in 
Malawi?’, BMC Health Services Research 6.1: 1 
 
Mwanahamuntu, M.H.; Sahasrabuddhe, V.V.; Kapambwe, S.; Pfaendler, K.S.; Chibwesha, 
C.; Mkumba, G.; Mudenda, V.; Hicks, M.L.; Vermund, S.H.; Stringer, J.S. and Parham, 
G.P. (2011) ‘Advancing Cervical Cancer Prevention Initiatives in Resource-Constrained 
Settings: Insights from the Cervical Cancer Prevention Program in Zambia’, PLoS Med 
8.5: e1001032 
 
Ngabo, F.; Nguimfack, J.; Nwaigwe, F.; Mugeni, C.; Muhoza, D.; Wilson, D.R.; Kalach, J.; 
Gakuba, R.; Karema, C. and Binagwaho, A. (2012) ‘Designing and Implementing an 
Innovative SMS-Based Alert System (RapidSMS-MCH) to Monitor Pregnancy and 
Reduce Maternal and Child Deaths in Rwanda’, Pan African Medical Journal 13.31 
 
North, D.C. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 
 
O’Donnell, G. (1998) ‘Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies’, Journal of Democracy 
9.3: 112–26 
 
OHCHR (2008) ‘The Right to Health’, Fact Sheet 31, Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet31.pdf (accessed 16 May 2017) 
 
Otto, K.; Shekar, M.; Herbst, C.H. and Mohammed, R. (2015) Information and 
Communication Technologies for Health Systems Strengthening: Opportunities, 
Criteria for Success, and Innovation for Africa and Beyond, Health, Nutrition and 
Population (HNP) Discussion Paper, Washington DC: World Bank 
 
Papp, S.A.; Gogoi, A. and Campbell, C. (2013) ‘Improving Maternal Health through Social 
Accountability: A Case Study from Orissa, India’, Global Public Health 8.4: 449–64 
 
Parham, G.P.; Mulindi, H.; Mwanahamuntu, S.K.; Muwonge, R.; Bateman, A.C.; Blevins, M.; 
Chibwesha, C.J.; Pfaendler, K.S.; Mudenda, V.; Shibemba, A.L.; Chisele, S.; Mkumba, 
G.; Vwalika, B.; Hicks, M.L.; Vermund, S.H.; Chi, B.H.; Stringer, J.S.; 
Sankaranarayanan, R. and Sahasrabuddhe, V.V. (2015) ‘Population-Level Scale-Up of 
Cervical Cancer Prevention Services in a Low-Resource Setting: Development, 
Implementation, and Evaluation of the Cervical Cancer Prevention Program in Zambia’, 
PLoS ONE 10.4: e0122169 
 
44 
 
Patnaik, L.; Joshi, A. and Sahu, T. (2015) ‘Mobile Phone-Based Education and Counseling to 
Reduce Stress Among Patients with Diabetes Mellitus Attending a Tertiary Care 
Hospital of India’, International Journal of Preventive Medicine 6: 37 
 
Paul, S. (2002) Holding the State to Account: Citizen Monitoring in Action, Bangalore, India: 
Books for Change 
 
Peixoto, T. and Fox, J. (2016) ‘When Does ICT-Enabled Citizen Voice Lead to Government 
Responsiveness?’, IDS Bulletin 41.1: 23–39, 
http://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/idsbo/article/view/34 (accessed 3 July 2017) 
 
Peter, J.; Barron, P. and Pillay, Y. (2016) ‘Guest Editorial: Using Mobile Technology to 
Improve Maternal, Child and Youth Health and Treatment of HIV Patients’, South 
African Medical Journal 106.1: 3–4 
 
Piette, J.D.; Valverde, H.; Marinec, N.; Jantz, R.; Kamis, K.; de la Vega, C.L.; Woolley, T. and 
Pinto, B. (2014) ‘Establishing an Independent Mobile Health Program for Chronic 
Disease Self-Management Support in Bolivia’, Frontiers in Public Health 2 
 
Rajan, R.; Raihan, A.; Alam, M.; Agarwal, S.; Ahsan, A.; Bashir, R.; Lefevre, A.; Kennedy, C. 
and Labrique, A.B. (2013) MAMA ‘Aponjon’ Formative Research Report, Baltimore MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Global mHealth Initiative 
 
Ringold, D.; Holla, A.; Koziol, M. and Srinivasan, S. (eds) (2012) Citizens and Service 
Delivery: Assessing the Use of Social Accountability Approaches in the Human 
Development Sectors, Directions in Development Human Development, Washington 
DC: World Bank 
 
Rotheram-Borus, M.J.; Tomlinson, M.; Gwegwe, M.; Comulada, W.S.; Kaufman, N. and 
Keim, M. (2012) ‘Diabetes Buddies: Peer Support Through a Mobile Phone Buddy 
System’, The Diabetes Educator 38.3: 357–65 
 
Sarwar, M.R. (2015) ‘Bangladesh Health Service Delivery: Innovative NGO and Private 
Sector Partnerships’, IDS Bulletin 46.3: 17–28, 
http://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/idsbo/article/view/98 (accessed 3 July 2017) 
 
Seebregts, C.; Barron, P.; Tanna, G.; Benjamin, P. and Fogwill, T. (2016) ‘MomConnect: An 
Exemplar Implementation of the Health Normative Standards Framework in South 
Africa’, South African Health Review 125–36 
 
Shah, S.; Singh, K.; Ali, M.K.; Mohan, V.; Kadir, M.M.; Unnikrishnan, A.G.; Sahay, R.K.; 
Varthakavi, P.; Dharmalingam, M.; Viswanathan, V.; Masood, Q.; Bantwal, G.; 
Khadgawat, R.; Desai, A.; Sethi, B.K.; Shivashankar, R.; Ajay, V.S.; Reddy, K.S.; 
Narayan, K.M.; Prabhakaran, D. and Tandon, N. (2012) ‘Improving Diabetes Care: 
Multi-Component Cardiovascular Disease Risk Reduction Strategies for People with 
Diabetes in South Asia—The CARRS Multi-Center Translation Trial’, Diabetes 
Research and Clinical Practice 98.2: 285–94 
 
Shariful Islam, S.M.; Niessen, L.W.; Ferrari, U.; Ali, L.; Seissler, J. and Lechner, A. (2015) 
‘Effects of Mobile Phone SMS to Improve Glycemic Control Among Patients with Type 
2 Diabetes in Bangladesh: A Prospective, Parallel-Group, Randomized Controlled Trial: 
Table 1’, Diabetes Care 38.8: e112–e113 
 
 
45 
 
Shieshia, M.; Noel, M.; Andersson, S.; Felling, B.; Alva, S.; Agarwal, S.; Lefevre, A.; 
Misomali, A.; Chimphanga, B.; Nsona, H. and Chandani, Y. (2014) ‘Strengthening 
Community Health Supply Chain Performance through an Integrated Approach: Using 
mHealth Technology and Multilevel Teams in Malawi’, Journal of Global Health 4.2: 
020406 
 
Singh, K.; Ranjani, H.; Rhodes, E. and Weber, M.B. (2016) ‘International Models of Care 
That Address the Growing Diabetes Prevalence in Developing Countries’, Current 
Diabetes Reports 16.8 
 
Sirker, K. and Cosic, S. (2007) Empowering the Marginalized: Case Studies of Social 
Accountability Initiatives in Asia, World Bank Institute Research Paper 266, 
Washington DC: World Bank 
 
Smith, M.; Madon, S.; Anifalaje, A.; Lazarro-Malecela, M. and Michael, E. (2008) ‘Integrated 
Health Information Systems in Tanzania: Experience and Challenges’, The Electronic 
Journal of Information Systems in Developing Countries 33.1: 1–21 
 
Smith, R.D. (2003) ‘Global Public Goods and Health’, Bulletin of the World Health 
Organization 81.7: 475 
 
Stremlau, N.; Fantini, E. and Gagliardone, I. (2015) ‘Patronage, Politics and Performance: 
Radio Call-in Programmes and the Myth of Accountability’, Third World Quarterly 36.8: 
1510–26 
 
Sullivan, W.M. (2000) ‘Medicine Under Threat: Professionalism and Professional Identity’, 
Canadian Medical Association Journal 162.5: 673–5 
 
Sultan, S. and Mohan, P. (2013) ‘Transforming Usage Data into a Sustainable Mobile Health 
Solution’, Electronic Markets 23.1: 63–72 
 
Sultan, S.; Mohan, P. and Sultan, N. (2009) ‘Managing Change: Experiences from a New E-
Health Initiative for Patients with Diabetes and Cardiovascular Disease’, IEEE 
International Symposium, http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=5282402 
(accessed 3 July 2017) 
 
United Nations (2013) Who Will Be Accountable? Human Rights and the Post-2015 
Development Agenda, New York and Geneva: United Nations 
 
Vahdat, H.L.; L’Engle, K.; Plourde, K.F.; Magaria, L. and Olawo, A. (2013) ‘There Are Some 
Questions You May Not Ask in a Clinic: Providing Contraception Information to Young 
People in Kenya Using SMS’, International Journal of Gynecology & Obstetrics 123: 
e2–e6 
 
van Olmen, J.; Eggermont, N.; van Pelt, M.; Hen, H.; de Man, J.; Schellevis, F.; Peters, D.H. 
and Bigdeli, M. (2016) ‘Patient-Centred Innovation to Ensure Access to Diabetes Care 
in Cambodia: The Case of MoPoTsyo’, Journal of Pharmaceutical Policy and Practice 
9.1 
 
Vayena, E.; Salathé, M.; Madoff, L.C. and Brownstein, J.S. (2015) ‘Ethical Challenges of Big 
Data in Public Health’, PLOS Computational Biology 11.2: e1003904 
 
Waldman, L. and Amazon-Brown, I. (2017) ‘New Digital Ways of Delivering Sex Education: A 
Practice Perspective’, IDS Bulletin 48.1, http://bulletin.ids.ac.uk/idsbo/article/view/2843 
(accessed 3 July 2017) 
46 
 
Waldman, L. and Stevens, M. (2015) ‘Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights and 
mHealth in Policy and Practice in South Africa’, Reproductive Health Matters 23.45: 
93–102 
 
WHO Global Observatory for eHealth (2011) mHealth: New Horizons for Health through 
Mobile Technologies, Geneva: World Health Organization 
 
Wolff-Piggott, B. (2016) ‘Towards an Affordance Perspective on mHealth Usage: A Clinic-
Level View’, Proceedings of SIG GlobDev Eighth Annual Workshop, Münster, 
Germany, 26 May 2015, www.globdev.org/files/GlobDev-ECIS-2015_Paper12.pdf 
(accessed 16 May 2017) 
 
Wolff-Piggott, B. and Rivett, U. (2016) An Activity Theory Approach to Affordance 
Actualisation in Mhealth: The Case of Momconnect, Research Papers 108, 
http://aisel.aisnet.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1086&context=ecis2016_rp 
(accessed 16 May 2017) 
 
World Bank (2004) World Development Report: Making Services Work for Poor People, 
Washington DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/527371468166770790/pdf/multi0page.pdf 
(accessed 3 July 2017) 
